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ABSTRACT
This article aims to provide useful insights into Romania’s and
Malta’s electricity sector, and critically assess the extent to which
their current state is conducive to European Union (“EU”) “smart
grid” objectives of energy decentralization and decarbonization.
The article concludes that Malta has embraced reforms aimed at
diversifying the energy sector, including the deployment of
renewable energy sources, electric vehicles, smart meters and
smart grids, all of which are aimed at tackling climate change
challenges. In the case of Romania, it enjoys relative energy
independence and security vis-à-vis its EU peers, but also other
neighboring countries; however, it remains one of the most
energy-intensive and polluting EU Member States. At the same
time, Romania’s performance in relation to increasing the share
of renewable energy sources in energy consumption and electricity
production places it among the leaders at the regional and EU
levels, particularly in terms of wind-generated power.
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (“EU”) pursues complex policies to promote the
shared and collective interests of its members to, among other things, energy
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security.1 To that end, energy policy at the EU level is by no means limited to the
external aspects of energy – such as energy trade policy (including trade tariffs), EUthird party infrastructural projects, broader energy diplomacy, etc. It also extends to
internal matters, including the attainment and optimization of a well-integrated
internal electricity system and market2 in line with other – not directly energy-related
– EU policy objectives, including the ‘greening’ of the EU economy, the
empowerment and protection of citizens/consumers, decentralization, digitalization,
and the resilience of the economy. A diversity of EU policies is in place including
policies that impose positive obligations of varying degrees of compulsion on
Member States. An example is the promotion of smart grids at the national level and
broader regional and EU levels.
This article examines the realities surrounding Romania’s and
Malta’s electricity sector vis-à-vis broader EU policy in relation to the “smartening”
of electricity systems. The purpose of this review is to provide useful insights into
Romania’s and Malta’s electricity sector, and critically assess the extent to which
their current state is conducive to EU “smart grid” objectives. To that end, Part II of
the article opens by sketching the principal contours of Romania’s electricity sector.
This is followed by an exposition of the “smart grid”-related features of Romania’s
electricity system. Part III provides an analysis of the situation in the electricity
sector in Malta. The article concludes in Part IV with a set of recommendations for
policymakers.
II. THE CASE OF ROMANIA
1. Romania’s Electricity Market
1.1 Key Figures concerning Energy and Electricity
In Romania, overall energy consumption witnessed a dramatic drop (c. 45.5%) between 1990 and 1999 and has remained relatively stable since.3 For
instance, energy consumption in 1990 stood at 43,027 kilotonnes of oil equivalent
(“ktoe”), which by 1999 dropped to 23,533 ktoe, and by 2016 to 22,878 ktoe.4 As
energy consumption has hitherto been a fairly reliable indicator of overall levels of
development and living standards in less developed economies,5 diachronic energy

1. See Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Conceptualizing EU Energy Security through an EU
Constitutional Law Perspective, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1225, 1241-42, 1259 (2013).
2. Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, The Energy Community, the Energy Charter Treaty, and the
Promotion of EU Energy Security 551, 552-53 (QMSCH. OF L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER, WORKING
PAPER NO. 203, 2015).
3. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, World Energy Balances: Annual Datasets for Romania, (2020),
https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tables?country=ROMANIA&energy=Balances&year=1990
(last visited Dec. 20, 2019) [hereinafter IEA] (Authors’ calculation based on figures for 1990 and 1999).
4. Id.
5. Schalk Cloete, Can We Really Decouple Living Standards from Energy Consumption?, ENERGY
CENTRAL (Jun. 8, 2015, 3:32 AM), https://www.energycentral.com/c/ec/can-we-really-decouple-livingstandards-energy-consumption (That said, it is not a determinative factor given that in sustainable and
robust economies where energy intensity has decreased, energy consumption no longer acts as an indicator
of economic growth.); JOSE GOLDEMBERG, U.N. DEV. PRGM., HUM. DEV. REP., ENERGY AND HUMAN
WELL-BEING (2001) (Until such time, however, particularly in relation to less developed economies such

Winter 2020

ENERGY DECENTRALIZATION

119

consumption figures make for sober reading, particularly when considered against
the backdrop of the economic and social impact of monumental events such as the
collapse of the various bureaucratic command economies in the early 90s (including
that of Romania following the 1989 uprising that toppled the Ceaușescu regime) and
the 2008 Financial Crisis. For instance, per capita electricity consumption levels
dropped in relation to 1990 figures. In 1990 consumption per capita stood at 2.92
megawatt hour (MWh), which subsequently dropped by 33% in 1999 to 1.94 MWh
before rising to 2.69 MWh in 2016.6 While the 2016 figure represents an increase
over that for 1999, it remains c. 8% below 1990 levels.7 In terms of the principal
purposes behind overall energy consumption for 2015, in descending order, the
purposes were: heating and cooling needs of the services sector and households,
industrial processes, passenger transport, other industry uses, and freight transport.8
In terms of the composition of the energy consumption mix, while it remains
dominated by hydrocarbons, encouragingly, their overall share has decreased over
the years. For instance, in 1990, coal, gas, and oil collectively accounted for c. 73.5%
of the mix while in 2016 for c. 64%.9 Much of this is due to considerably reduced
use of coal and gas – for instance, while in 1990 c. 3,013 ktoe of coal and 19,854
ktoe of gas were used, in 2016 the figures were 643 ktoe and 5,479 ktoe,
respectively.10 Remarkably, the energy mix had included no nuclear prior to 1996.11
On the other hand, the share of recycled and/or renewable energy sources (“RES”),
albeit historically meager, has increased. For instance, in 1990 it stood at just 1.36%,
rising to 11.9% in 1999, and to 16.4% in 2016.12 In relation to 2017 figures, the
European Commission considers Romania’s efforts pursuant to its obligations under

as Romania, energy consumption may be taken into account, along with other indicators such as literacy,
longevity, and so on to deduce levels of human wellbeing. For a general discussion on the relationship
between energy consumption and living standards.).
6. IEA, Electricity Consumption Per Capita, Romania 1990-2017, (2020), https://www.iea.org/dataandstatistics?country=ROMANIA&fuel=Energy%20consumption&indicator=Electricity%20consumption
%20per%20capita (Authors’ calculation based on IEA World Energy Balances).
7. Id.
8. Stefan D. Cîrstea et al., Current Situation and Future Perspectives of the Romanian Renewable
Energy, 11 ENERGIES 3 (2018) (where it is stated that in relation to the 254 TWh equivalent of energy
consumed during 2015, 39% (97 TWh) was for the heating and cooling needs of the services sector
and households (roughly on a 4/5ths to 1/5th basis), 48 TWh for ‘industrial processes’, 48 TWh
for passenger transport, 27 TWh for the ‘rest of industrial’ consumption, 17 TWh for freight transport,
and c. 4 TWh for agriculture).
9. IEA, supra note 3 (Authors’ calculations of the energy consumption mix are based on table).
10. Id.
11. Id. (That said, the share of electricity ranged between 10.8% and 16.2% of the final energy
consumption mix between 1990 and 2016. Electricity itself, however, is generated from a variety of
sources including nuclear. However, between 1990 and 1995, no electricity had been generated from
nuclear. However, nuclear electricity generation commenced in 1996 and took off in earnest by 2008.).
12. Id.; see also IEA, WORLD ENERGY BALANCES: DATABASE DOCUMENTATION, 175 (2019 ed.
2019) (‘[B]iofuels and waste’, and ‘geothermal and solar etc.,’ are the resource categories included under
this rubric. Incidentally, according to the IEA, Romania’s methodology re-estimating domestic
geothermal energy generation/production differs from IEA standards, therefore, data comparisons with
other countries may be misleading.).
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Directive 2009/28/EC13 – namely, that by 2020 at least 24% of total energy
consumption comes from RES – to be well on track.14
While the share of electricity vis-à-vis the composition of the total
consumption energy mix diachronically has risen – namely, from c. 10.8% in 1990,
to c. 12.4% in 1999 and 16.26% in 2016,15 the figures for 1999 and 2016 remain
below 1990 figures in absolute terms.16 For instance, electricity consumption stood
at 4,663 ktoe in 1990, dropping to 2,917 ktoe in 1999, before partially recovering to
c. 3,719 ktoe in 2016.17 Put differently, 67.86 terawatt hours (“TWh”) of electricity
were consumed in 1990, 43.5 TWh in 1999, and 52.96 TWh in 2016.18 Incidentally,
the electricity consumption ratio between non-household vis-à-vis household endusers stood at 74%/26% during 2017.19
As is the case with other countries transitioning from bureaucratic
command-economy20 to market-economy21 models, drops in energy consumption are
also witnessed in the case of Romania following such disruptive socio-political and
economic events including regime collapse and the 2008 Financial Crisis, albeit, in
relation to the latter, to a lesser extent for Romania.22
In relation to energy production, diachronic figures indicate a significant
drop over 1990 figures as not only has production failed to return to 1990 levels, it
has yet to surpass 2008 levels. For instance, energy production stood at 40,840 ktoe
in 1990, 27,961 in 1999, 28,978 in 2008, 28,339 in 2009, and 24,868 in 2016. The
drop between 1990 and 1999 is c. -31.5%, and between 1990 and 2016, c. -39.2%.23
When considering this trend along with energy consumption trends, the fact that
industry and transport account for c. 54%24 and, more generally, that non-household
use accounts for c. 76% of energy consumption, it is fair to assume that they are
reflective of the general state of the Romanian economy over the period in scope,
13. Directive 2009/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 46, 60-61 (EC).
14. Commission Renewable Energy Progress Report, at 3, COM (2019) 225 final (Sept. 4, 2019).
15. IEA, supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Autoritatea Nationala de Reglementare in Domeniul Energiei [Romanian Energy Regulatory
Authority], National Report 2017, at 105 (2018) [hereinafter ANRE].
20. Command
Economy,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/command%20economy (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) (“An economic system in
which activity is controlled by a central authority and the means of production are publicly owned.”).
21. Market
Economy,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/command%20economy (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) (“An economy in which most
goods and services are produced and distributed through free markets.”).
22. IEA, supra note 3 (A year after the outbreak of the 2008 Crisis, Romania’s total energy
consumption dropped from 26,205 ktoe (2008) to 23,341 ktoe (2009). Subsequent annual figures have
neither exceeded nor returned to 2008 levels, and have generally hovered between 23,807 ktoe (2011) and
22,878 ktoe (2016). (Calculations based on IEA World Energy Balances 2018 database figures though
navigating the various parameters available therein.)).
23. Id.
24. Id. (Namely, the share of total energy consumption is 26.6% for transport, and 27.6% for
industry).
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particularly in relation to population and Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) levels for
1990 vis-à-vis 1999, and 2008 vis-à-vis 2009.25 While economic growth has
generally been robust, this has chiefly been through consumer spending and salary
increases. 26 However, outward migration has been rife and has resulted in a
shrinking workforce and skills shortages that, in turn, have undermined Romania’s
competitiveness internationally. What is more, inequality and poverty remain high
with increasing regional disparities, rates of inflation and child poverty that are the
highest in the EU, and investment flows that remain volatile despite Romania having
one of the highest investment ratios (c. 22.6% of GDP in 2017) in the EU.27
In relation to electricity generation, although the trends are broadly
reflective of those indicated earlier regarding 1990 vis-à-vis 1999 and 2008 vis-à-vis
2009, the absolute figures in 1990 vis-à-vis 2016 represent a slight increase
(+1.23%).28 The mix and share of the sources behind electricity generation have
changed diachronically (cf. Table 1).

25. Id.; IEA, WORLD ENERGY BALANCES: DATABASE DOCUMENTATION 175 (2019 ed. 2019) (In
1990, Romania’s population and GDP stood at 23 million and 124 billion USD, respectively, which
dropped to 22 million and 107 billion USD in 1999. In 2008, the figures were 21 million and 182 billion
USD, respectively, before dropping to 20 million and 169 billion USD in 2009. In 2016, these were 19.7
million and c. 199 billion USD, respectively.).
26. Commission Staff Working Document Country Report Romania 2019 Including an In-Depth
Review on the Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, at 3-19, 35-73, SWD (2019)
1022 final (Feb. 27, 2019).
27. Id.
28. IEA, supra note 3 (Electricity generation stood at 64,309 in 1990, 50,710 in 1999, 64,956 in 2008,
58,014 in 2009, and 65,103 in 2016 (figures in gigawatt hours (GWh))).
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Table 1. Electricity generation – Sources and their Share29

As is the case with total energy production, hydrocarbons feature heavily
in the electricity generation mix.30 More positively, however, their overall share is
decreasing, while, conversely, the share of nuclear, recyclable, and renewable
sources – representing low- and zero-emissions electricity generation – is in fact
increasing. 31 Nuclear energy currently accounts for up to 17.6% of electricity
generation,32 and, according to national policy, is set to remain an important
component in future energy mixes. For instance, there are plans to extend current

29. Id. (Table 1: Data for 1990-2016 compiled from Annual Datasets from IEA World Energy
Balances); see also (Table 1: Data for 2017-2018 from EUROSTAT STATISTICS EXPLAINED, Energy
Balances - Early Estimates, (data extracted June 2019, planned update June 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_balances__early_estimates#Electricity_.26_heat (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) [hereinafter EUROSTAT].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. EUROSTAT, Energy Balances - Early Estimates, (data extracted June 2019, planned update June
2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Energy_balances__early_estimates#Electricity_.26_heat (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
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nuclear power capacity by the construction of two more units of c. 706.5 megawatts
(MW) output capacity each.33
In relation to RES, in 2018 their cumulative share (for the most part, wind,
solar, and hydro) accounted for c. 40.6% of electricity generation thus going headto-head with the cumulative share of hydrocarbons (for the most part, solid fossil
fuels, and gas) accounting for c. 40.8%.34 In fact, in 2015 Romania was the first
Member State to achieve its target re RES share in the electricity generation mix well
ahead of the 2020 deadline.35 Romania’s efforts to draw more of its energy needs
from RES are evident in its fast-growing wind market in relation to the broader
Southeast European region.36 For instance, Romania’s installed wind generation
capacity alone went from 7 MW in 2007 to 1,941 MW in 2018.37 As a consequence,
the share of wind in electricity generation has increased considerably, as the
diachronic figures cited earlier indicate.38 This is projected to increase to c. 3,000
MW by 2020 and to 4,300 MW by 2030.39 A similar trend is likely for solar given
current projections – namely, c. 1,500 MW by 2020 vis-à-vis c. 3,100 MW by 2030.40
In terms of RES exploitation in its broad sense, it is worth noting that the greatest
share relates to electricity production (44% based on 2014 figures), followed by
heating and cooling (28%), and transportation (4.5%).41
Moreover, the latest figures (2018) indicate that total electricity supply
stood at c. 55,711 GWh, of which c. 49,754 GWh was domestically consumed.42 As
mentioned earlier, total gross electricity production in Romania stood at 64,383
GWh while total net production at 58,722 GWh.43 Electricity imports for 2018 stood
at just c. 3,696 GWh while exports at 6,241 GWh.44 In that sense, Romania’s
electricity needs are not heavily dependent on the broader regional electricity
system/s. What is more, the primary sources for Romanian electricity generation –
namely, solid fossil fuels under the ‘coal’ rubric (e.g., coal, coke, lignite, etc.), gas,
hydro, and nuclear – are, for their most part, available domestically.45 In that sense,
Romania, arguably, enjoys relative electricity security when its supply and demand

33. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Romania Commercial Guide: Energy Sector, U.S. DEP’T OF COM,
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/romania-energy (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
34. EUROSTAT, supra note 32.
35. Cîrstea et al., supra note 8 at 7.
36. Cristian P. Chioncel et al., Overview of the Wind Energy Market and Renewable Energy Policy
in Romania, 163 INT’L CONF. ON APPLIED SCI. 2-3 (For an overview of Romanian wind electricity
generation).
37. Cf. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 33.
38. See IEA & EUROSTAT, supra note 29, at Table 1.
39. See Integrated National Energy and Climate Change Plan for 2021-2030 65 (2018) (Rom.)
[hereinafter NECP].
40. Id.
41. Cf. EUGENIA GUȘILOV, ROMANIAN ENERGY CENTER, RES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
ROMANIA AND BULGARIA 2 (2018) (Rom.).
42. EUROSTAT, supra note 32.
43. Id.
44. Cf. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 33.
45. Member States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment 2013 O.J. (145) 239,
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf.
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aspects are analyzed.46 This issue, along with the degree of interconnectedness of
Romania’s electricity system with that of its neighbors and the broader regional
electricity system, shall be explored elsewhere in this report.
Lastly, in terms of distribution losses,47 during 2018 c. 5,957 GWh of
electricity was lost during transmission and distribution.48 This represents c. 10% of
total net electricity production over 2018 figures (namely, c. 58,722 GWh).49 During
2017 the loss rate had been c. 11.8% (namely, c. 6,993 out of c. 59,063 GWh).50
While these figures are generally within normal ranges,51 losses, when preventable,
suggest inefficiencies that grid participants – particularly those involved in the
transmission and distribution aspects of the Romanian electricity sector – ought to
address. As shall be explored in subsequent parts of this report, optimising the smartgrid aspects of Romania’s electricity system – particularly through, among other
things, stimulating demand responsiveness and storage capacity development, and
the promotion of self-generation – could result in greater energy efficiencies and thus
enhance Romania’s energy security.
1.2 Key Characteristics and Structure of Romania’s Electricity Market
As mentioned earlier, Romania shares certain legacy features with other
former bureaucratic command economies and, in line with its Euro-Atlanticist
orientation following the collapse of the Ceaușescu regime,52 has undergone deep
structural reforms similar to other EU peers including Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech

46. Cf. NECP, supra note 39, at 65 (This is in line with broader regional – namely, non-OECD Europe
(including Romania) and Eurasia – trends where, although energy production is very unevenly distributed,
the region as a whole is energy self-sufficient, and where the regional electricity mix (for 2016) was
dominated by gas (40%), coal (22%), and nuclear (17%). Incidentally, the ‘non-OECD Europe and
Eurasia’ region was the second largest nuclear-producing region globally with Armenia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine producing 11.8% of global nuclear power. RES, for their part, accounted
for 19% of the regional electricity mix).
47. WORLD
BANK
GROUP,
DataBank:
World
Development
Indicators,
2020,https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&type=metadata&series=EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS
[hereinafter WBG] (The World Bank defines distribution losses as “power transmission and distribution
losses include losses in transmission between sources of supply and points of distribution and in the
distribution to consumers, including pilferage.”).
48. Cf. EUROSTAT, supra note 32.
49. Cf. WBG, IEA STATISTICS, Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (% of Output),
(2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/eg.elc.loss.zs (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (Percentile figure
calculated based on figures therein. Note that 2018 losses are close to 2014 levels (namely, 11%) thus
grouping Romania with Angola, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Ukraine, and Uruguay).
50. Id.
51. Id.; cf. INDEX MUNDI, MAP OF ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION LOSSES (%
OF OUTPUT) - EUROPE https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS/map/europe
(The ‘Index Mundi’ data aggregator has taken the 2014 World Bank dataset and has produced an
interactive map concerning electricity losses).
52. Cf. IONEL NICU SAVA, GEOPOLITICAL PATTERNS OF EURO-ATLANTICISM: A PERSPECTIVE FROM
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 5-6 (2004), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97318/04_Jun.pdf (For an account of
geopolitical developments in the region, including Romania’s 2004 accession to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization).
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Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.53 Romania’s
energy sector – including electricity – has been no exception. As had been the case
with all major utilities, during the bureaucratic command economy years, the entire
electricity sector amounted to a vertically integrated state-owned and -run operation
(cf. Figure 1).
Figure 1: The breakup of the vertically integrated electricity sector

Source: Maxim 201354
This changed around 1998 with the initial steps towards its reform in light
of efforts to integrate within the global economy including joining the EU. More
specifically, the electricity sector underwent substantive reform55 involving
extensive privatisation, market liberalisation,56 energy mix diversification (including
RES share increase), and marketization/liquidity. In relation to the latter, this has
been to facilitate domestic and cross-border wholesale trade and price convergence
aimed at achieving greater energy efficiencies across the EU and further integration
concerning the Internal Energy (including electricity) Market (“IEM”) and, more

53. Oleh Havrylyshyn et al., 25 Years of Reforms in Ex-Communist Countries: Fast and Extensive
Reforms led to Higher Growth and More Political Freedom, CATO INSTITUTE (July 12, 2016),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/25-years-reforms-ex-communist-countries-fastextensive-reforms-led.
54. Alexandru Maxim, Explaining the Behavior of Romanian Household Electricity Consumers on a
Changing Market, 20 PROCEDIA ECON. & FIN. 383, 387 (2015).
55. Id. at 384.
56. (Including price deregulation, unbundling, fair access for all market participants, etc.).
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generally, the Energy Union on a market basis.57 The consequences included the
emergence of two distinct electricity markets: retail and wholesale.58 In relation to
the former, it pertains to transactions between suppliers and end-users (household
and commercial alike), while, in relation to the latter, to facilitate transactions
involving large volumes of electricity primarily between generators, market
intermediaries, and suppliers.59
Furthermore, prior to 2018, the retail electricity market itself had been
divided between the competitive and the universal service segments.60 Households
were eligible for regulated tariffs set by the Autoritatea Națională de Reglementare
În Domeniul Energiei (“ANRE”), i.e., the national energy regulator.61 According to
2016 figures concerning electricity prices across the EU, Romania had the sixth
lowest EU average household price (EUR 132/MWh), and the third lowest industrial
price (EUR 80/MWh).62 Further to successive price deregulation – commencing c.
2007 in response to IMF, World Bank, and European Commission recommendations
– non-household tariffs were entirely deregulated by 2014, followed by household
tariffs by 2018, which brought about the full liberalisation of the electricity market
per se.63 Prior to that, the universal service segment amounted to just c. 13% and
10% of domestic electricity consumption respectively for 2016 and 2017, and
following its termination, 100% of households are now on the competitive market
segment.64 Overall, since 2013 the average final price for households varied very
little while for non-household end-users it declined.65 However, this is contradicted
by a systematic review of the impact that RES-related levies had had on household
prices, which suggests that some price increases took place.66 Notwithstanding the
above, some tariff regulation on the part of ANRE does take place chiefly in relation
to tariffs imposed on participants for grid access, connection, transmission, etc., to
ensure fair and equal access to the national network, and in relation to the various
surplus components paid by end-users that are added to the final price of electricity
consumed.67
In terms of the wholesale electricity market, transactions are carried out by
market participants licensed by ANRE and include sale and resale of electricity.68 In
that sense, volumes traded exceed the physical quantity delivered from production

57. Cf. European Parliament, Internal Energy Market, FACT SHEETS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION,
(May 2019) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/45/internal-energy-market.
58. Alexandra Florea & Anda Belciu, Study on Electricity Markets in Romania, VII DATABASE SYS.
J. no. 4, 2016, at 13.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id.
62. Cîrstea et al., supra note 8, at 3.
63. ANRE, supra note 19 at 6.
64. Id. at 5; see also cf. ANRE NATIONAL REPORT 2016 6 (2016).
65. ANRE, supra note 19 at 128.
66. Cf. Alexandru Maxim, Relevant Attributes of Renewable Energy Development in the Case of
Romanian Households, 20 PROCEDIA ECON. & FIN. 372, 373 (2015).
67. ANRE, supra note 19 at 127 (for a breakdown of the final price paid by end-users into its
components, e.g., value added tax, RES support, actual electricity use etc.).
68. Florea & Belciu, supra note 58.
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to consumption.69 There are several components to the wholesale market including
a regulated agreements market, directly negotiated agreements market, centralised
bilateral agreements with neighbouring markets, the Intra-Day Market (“IDM”) for
transactions within an hour and up to a day, Day-Ahead Market (“DAM”) for 24 to
48 hours, and the Balancing Market (“BM”) on which participant owners of
dispatchable units of power sell or buy active electricity to or from the TSO.70
A further market is that for “green certificates” (“GCs”) issued to RES
electricity generators to encourage greater use of cleaner energy sources. Producers
would receive up to six certificates per MWh of electricity produced depending on
the resource and plant type,71 although the number per resource/type was reduced by
ANRE in 2013 shortly after launching the scheme.72 In 2017 the government set up
the market mechanism for trading GCs on a centralised, anonymous basis to
encourage competitive, transparent, public, and non-discriminatory trading. ANRE
along with Societatea Comercială Operatorul Pie ei de Energie Electrică
(“OPCOM”) – i.e., the power market operator – provide effective regulation over the
markets for GC spot transactions and GC term transactions.73
In terms of market liquidity and cross-border wholesale trade, this takes
place through a variety of mechanisms including bilateral market mechanisms with
most neighbouring countries – Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine –
through long-term (monthly and annual) auctions and short-term (daily and intradaily) explicit or implicit auctions principally facilitated through national TSOs.74 In
relation to the DAM, a price coupling mechanism with those of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Slovakia – namely, the 4M Market Coupling mechanism – is in
operation.75 Moreover, in 2017, TSOs and designated electricity market operators
from Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, and Romania (with Croatia
joining subsequently) signed an agreement to establish a cross-border IDM
mechanism (“XBID”) to couple their respective IDMs for electricity.76 The Power
Exchange Central Europe (“PXE”) has also been in operation since 2007 and as of
2016, it offers trading in Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Slovak
electricity.77 Furthermore, Romania has committed to the integration of its DAM and
IDM into the broader European Single Day-Ahead and Intra-Day Coupling power

69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 15, 18-19 (In relation to the BM, it is described as where the ‘balance between electricity
demand and production is established on a commercial basis, in real time to ensure the availability of
enough energy so as to balance the system. The BM is a mandatory market, which means that participants
must market all the available electricity here for a fuller account on how the various markets operate.).
71. Cf.
WBG,
IEA
STATISTICS,
RES
PROFILE
FOR
ROMANIA,
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/romania/name-33751-en.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2019)
(Also, note that the value of GCs ranged between EUR 27 and EUR 55).
72. Cf. Cîrstea et al., supra note 8, at 13, 18; cf. Gușilov, supra note 41, at 4.
73. Cf. Gușilov, supra note 41, at 4.
74. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 44–48, 94–96 (There is less activity in relation to Moldova.).
75. Cf. Florea & Belciu, supra note 58, at 18.
76. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 77.
77. Paolo Bertoldi et al., Demand Response Status in EU Member States, 2016 JRC SCI. POL’Y REP.
(EUR
27998
EN),
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC101191/ldna27998enn.pdf.
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markets (SDAC and SIDC, respectively).78 While all these are developments upon
which the EU looks favourably, the European Commission has recommended more
be done to further promote regional market integration through optimal market
liberalisation that currently seems to be obstructed by some practices.79
In terms of electricity generation, the electricity generation sector is chiefly
based along the lines of the primary input resource (i.e., the energy resource used to
generate electricity). The principal plants remain state-owned – including the
Cernavodă nuclear plant, 208 hydropower plants, and 10 coal-fired power plants –
although the private sector is also involved in generation and is licensed by ANRE.
It is worth noting that during 2017 the five largest producers accounted for c. 76.5%
of the electricity generated that year.80
In terms of transmission, the transmission system along with its
interconnections with the systems of neighbouring countries is operated by,
Compania Na ionala de Transport al Energiei Electrice ‘Transelectrica SA.,’
(Transelectrica), the national transmission system operator (“TSO”), majorityowned by the Romanian state.81 Transelectrica operates according to the ownership
unbundling (“OU”) model.82 Transelectrica also manages the operation of the
electricity market, and is responsible for operational stability and safety, grid and
market infrastructure development, and coordination of electricity exchanges with
neighboring electricity systems.83 The total length of the transmission system is c.
8,834 km of overhead electricity lines.84

78. NECP, supra note 39, at 12.
79. Cf. Commission Recommendation of 18 June 2019 on the Draft Integrated National Energy and
Climate Plan of Romania for 2021-2030, at 4-5, C (2019) 4423 final (2019) (In its review of Romania’s
Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan, the Commission specifically recommended that Romania
take further action in relation to optimal market integration, and listed the need to eliminate ‘barriers to
cross-border trade, including export restrictions [ . . . that] negative impact of wholesale price regulation’,
thus suggesting that such practices remain an issue in Romania.).
80. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 80–81. (Namely, in relation to 61,324 GWh of electricity produced
in 2017, Complexul Energetic Oltenia SA produced 14,933, Hidroelectrica SA 14,039, SN
Nuclearelectrica SA 11,509, OMV Petrom SA 3,645, and Electrocentrale București SA 2,841 GWh.).
81. Id. at 10 (58.7% owned by the state, 33.9% by legal entity shareholders, and 7.4% by natural
person shareholders.); cf. see generally Delia Vasiliu, Electricity Regulation in Romania: Overview,
PRACTICAL LAW COUNTRY Q&A, 4-566-2907, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-5662907?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1
(last
visited
December 3, 2019).
82. ANRE, supra note 19, at 10; cf. see also CNTEE TRANSELECTRICIA SA, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 ON
THE STAND-ALONE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CNTEE “TRANSELECTRICIA” SA at 19 (2018) (Rom.),
http://www.transelectrica.ro/documents/10179/6633653/1_Rap_Anual_2017_ENG_v+30+03+2018_2+
30+AM.pdf/6325d856-8d16-404e-9d7c-4ccfc6afcc33 [hereinafter TRANSELECTRICIA] (Note that TSO
classification is subject to an EU certification process resulting in one of three possible classifications
concerning a TSO’s model: namely, ownership unbundling (OU), independent system operator (ISO), and
independent transmission operator (ITO)).
83. TRANSELECTRICIA, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 ON THE STAND-ALONE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF
CNTEE
“TRANSELECTRICIA”
SA
at
129
(2018)
(Rom.),
http://www.transelectrica.ro/documents/10179/6633653/1_Rap_Anual_2017_ENG_v+30+03+2018_2+
30+AM.pdf/6325d856-8d16-404e-9d7c-4ccfc6afcc33.
84. Id. at 46.
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In terms of supply and distribution, currently, 151 suppliers are licensed by
ANRE to supply electricity85 and 51 to distribute electricity.86 However, five large
electricity suppliers dominate – namely, CEZ Vanzare S.A., E.On Energie Romania
S.A., ENEL Energie S.A., Electrica Furnizare S.A., and ENEL Energie Muntenia S.A.
– and are licensed by ANRE to cover different regions.87 In that sense, although this
form of market sharing is endorsed by the national regulator (i.e., ANRE), than being
a product of cartel behavior per se, anti-competitive effects may yet arise. For
instance, where licensing is on a preferential basis or in some unduly restrictive
manner, or where there are other barriers for prospective entrants to the distribution
and supply side of the electricity market. Should this be the case, violations of EU
competition rules may also be at play.88
Furthermore, there are eight distribution system operators (“DSOs”)89
nationally who provide electricity to 9.3 million users90 and whose distribution
activities are entirely unbundled from supply and in line with legal requirements to
liberalize the electricity market.91 Lifting the corporate veil over DSO ownership,
distribution is largely within private hands92 with various joint-stock/public
companies – national and foreign – owning significant shares in the eight DSOs.93 In
terms of the transmission and distribution infrastructure of the national grid itself, it
includes overhead electrical lines with rated voltages of 750 kV, 400 kV, and 110
85. Cf. STIRA ELECTRONIC SRL, Lista Firmelor Care Detin Licenta De Furnizare Pentru Energie
Electrica Si/Sau Gaze Naturale, [List of Companies Licensed to Supply Electricity and/or Natural Gas]
(last updated Sept. 12, 2019), http://licitatii.furnizorenergie.ro/furnizori/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2019)
(Rom.).
86. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 10.
87. Cf. ANRE, Lista Furnizorilor de Energie Electrica pe Piata cu Amanuntul in Luna August 2016,
[List of Electricity Suppliers on the Retail Market in August 2016] https://www.anre.ro/ro/energieelectrica/consumatori/lista-furnizori (last visited Dec. 8, 2019) (Rom.).
88. See generally
EU,
Competition Rules
in
the EU,
(Nov. 14, 2019),
https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/selling-in-eu/competition-between-businesses/competition-ruleseu/index_en.htm (last visited December 9, 2019) (For general information about EU competition rules).
89. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 10 (Namely, Delgaz Grid, Distribu ie Energie Oltenia, e-Distributie
Banat, e-Distributie Dobrogea, e-Distributie Muntenia, Societatea de Distribu ie a Energiei Electrice
Muntenia Nord, Societatea de Distribu ie a Energiei Electrice Transilvania Nord, and Societatea de
Distribu ie a Energiei Electrice Transilvania Sud.).
90. Id. at 21 (Based on 2017 figures of 5.1 million and 4.2 million, in urban and rural areas,
respectively.).
91. Id. at 10–12 (DSOs with fewer than 100,000 customers are not required to unbundle their
activities. ANRE Order no. 73/2014 stipulates DSO obligations in terms of independence and
unbundling.).
92. Societatea de Administrare a Participațiilor în Energie, Descrierea Societății, [Description of the
Company], http://www.sape-energie.ro/descrierea-societatii/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2019) (The exception
being Delgaz Grid in which the Ministry of Energy holds a 13.5% share. Also, the nature of some
shareholders suggests some state involvement. For instance, Fondul Proprietatea SA is a joint-stock
company set up by the Romanian state principally to provide some degree of reparation concerning
expropriations that took place during the bureaucratic command-economy years. Another entity, SAPE
SA, a minority shareholder in three of the eight DSOs, was established under government order to facilitate
the management of investments in the electricity distribution system); see ANRE, supra note 19 at 11
(regarding ownership structure).
93. ANRE, supra note 19, at 11–12 (Shareholders include the Allianz Group (i.e., a German global
financial services conglomerate), CEZ (i.e., a Czech energy conglomerate), E.ON, Enel Investment
Holding B.V., and Energetica Electrica (i.e., a domestic electricity conglomerate)).
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kV, and substations with upper voltage of 750 kV, 400 kV, and 220 kV. The total
length of the transmission network is c. 8,835 km, including 426 km of
interconnection lines, the bulk of which was commissioned before 1980.94
In terms of interconnectivity, the current interconnection capacity of the
national transmission system stands at c. 7%.95 This places Romania’s electricity
system among the least interconnected systems in the EU, 96 despite its current
seventeen interconnectors with five countries.97 However, this figure was set to
increase to 9% with the completion of the interconnection with Serbia in 2018,98 thus
bringing it closer a step to the existing target of 10%, and the 2030 target of 15%.99
The EU pursues greater electricity interconnectivity for Central and South Eastern
Europe (“CESEC”) with other third states and Energy Community100 parties in

94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. at 5, 55 (Calculations based on 2017 values for net generation capacity vis-à-vis net transfer
capacity.).
96. Cf. Commission Communication on Strengthening Europe’s Energy Networks, at 10–11, COM
(2017) 718 final (Nov. 23, 2017) (Along with Cyprus 0%, Poland 4%, Spain 6%, the UK 6%, Bulgaria
7%, Ireland 7%, Italy 8%, Germany 9%, and Portugal 9% – compare with Luxembourg 109%, Lithuania
88%, Slovenia 84%, Estonia 63%, and Hungary 58%).
97. Cf. NECP, supra note 39, at 137 (Namely, 4 with Bulgaria, 5 with Serbia, 2 with Hungary, 2 with
Ukraine, and 5 with Moldova).
98. ANRE, supra note 19, at 54.
99. Cf. Outcome of the October 2014 European Council, 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/2030/docs/2030_euco_conclusions_en.pdf
(The
specific target means that each Member State should have in place electricity transmission systems that
allow a given ratio of electricity generated domestically to be transported across its borders to
neighbouring systems.); cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Electricity Interconnection Targets, (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/electricityinterconnection-targets; see generally European Union MEMO/15/4486, Connecting Power Markets to
Deliver Security of Supply, Market Integration and the Large-Scale Uptake of Renewables, (Feb. 25,
2015) ((For further information on EU targets) (Note that the Commission Expert Group on electricity
interconnection targets in its 2017 report recommends that a different scoring system be adopted given
that the existing one is based on previous electricity market realities in which RES played a lesser role.
Greater take-up of RES in electricity generation brings with it a greater need and potential for
interconnectivity between neighbouring systems for the purposes of energy efficiency and security.));
Report of the Commission Expert Group on Electricity Interconnection Targets, at 35–40 (Nov. 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/electricityinterconnection-targets/expert-group-electricity-interconnection-targets.
100. See generally cf. ENERGY COMMUNITY, https://www.energy-community.org/ (last visited Dec.
13, 2019) (The Energy Community is an international treaty-based organisation constituted under the
Treaty establishing the Energy Community, signed in October 2005 in Athens, Greece, by the European
Community (i.e., the EU’s predecessor in terms of legal personality/capacity to contract international
agreements at the time of negotiations), on the one hand, and several neighbouring countries – namely,
Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, what at the time had been the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and what had been at the time the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. Since, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania have become EU
Members and thus subsumed behind that entity. The current list of parties to that treaty are the EU,
Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Ukraine. Also, note that Armenia, Norway, and Turkey are observers. The Energy Community was set up
as a means of furthering EU energy interests including regional energy and electricity integration.); See
generally, Leal-Arcas & Filis, supra note 2 (For an extensive discussion on the systemic relationship
between the Energy Community and the EU).
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relation to, among other things, electricity market, infrastructure, and renewable
development.101
In relation to its prospective plans, Romania seeks to enhance the
interconnection capacity by, among other things, establishing corridors for
transmission networks and special legal regimes regarding land availability,
authorizations, and other regulatory matters to facilitate deployment; finalising the
400 kV power ring of the national transmission system; developing new
interconnections between production and transmission points. Other measures
include the pursuit of regional coordination concerning cross-border infrastructural
projects, the development of bi-directional interconnection capacities, and the
streamlining of cross-border wholesale trading (e.g., network codes and entry/exit
tariffs, etc.) as a means of facilitating greater electricity liquidity regionally.102 In
fact, the European Commission has specifically recommended that Romania take
further action to intensify regional cooperation aimed at, among other things, optimal
regional interconnectivity. 103
It is worth noting that there are also cooperation projects with Moldova,
Turkey, and Ukraine aimed at the integration of their respective electricity systems
with that of Romania and the EU.104 Notably, across the region, selected projects
have been identified as projects of common interest (“PCIs”) to optimize
interconnectivity and allow for effective commercial transactions, and facilitate
greater optimization of RES.105 In fact, EU Regulation No. 347/2013 proposes
measures aimed at, among other things, the integration and operation of the internal
power market, energy security at the EU level, promotion and development of energy
efficiency and energy from RES, and the promotion of interconnection between
national and regional power grids.106 What is more, EU cohesion funds – chiefly the
European Regional Development Fund (“ERDF”) – contribute to smart energy
storage and transmission system projects, and Romania (collectively with Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Greece, Lithuania, and Poland) benefits from a EUR 2 billion
allocation for 2014-2020, with a fourth directly benefiting PCIs.107

101. Report of the Commission Expert Group on Electricity Interconnection Targets 2017, supra note
99, at 6.
102. Cf. NECP, supra note 39, at 14.
103. Cf. Commission Recommendation of June 18, 2019, Draft Integrated National Energy and
Climate Plan of Romania Covering the Period 2021-2030, supra note 79, at 5.
104. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 52–55.
105. Id. at 55–72, (for a list of projects and their status as of August 2018).
106. Council Regulation 347/2013 of April 17, 2013, Guidelines for Trans-European Energy
Infrastructure and Repealing Decision 1364/2006/EC and Amending Regulations 713/2009/EC,
714/2009/EC, and 715/2009/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 115) 39, 41.
107. Cf. Communication on Strengthening Europe’s Energy Networks, at 2–3, 8–9, 11, COM (2017)
718 final (Nov. 23, 2017); see also Union List (The third ‘Union List’ of PCIs adopted by way of a
Commission Delegated Regulation, Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/540 of 23 November 2017
Amending Regulation No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Union
List of Projects of Common Interest, 2018 O.J. (L 90) 38, 40–44, for, among other things, a list of
electricity infrastructure projects aimed at greater interconnectivity between, on the one hand, Romania,
and Bulgaria and Serbia, on the other.).
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1.3 Policy and Regulatory Responsibility
Energy policy – including in relation to the electricity sector – is
multifaceted and as such engages a much wider range of policy matters than one
might initially expect. This reality is reflected in the complexity surrounding policy
responsibility and competence vis-à-vis the EU, which, in relation to certain energyrelated matters, enjoys exclusive competence (e.g., setting trade tariffs for electricity
imports from third states), while in relation to other matters, degrees ranging from
shared to no competence.108 At the national level, the Romanian government is
overall responsible for energy policy including over the electricity sector, with the
Ministry of Energy bearing principal policy responsibility, and the Ministry of
Environment also contributing to the extent of policy overlap. ANRE (discussed
earlier) is the principal regulatory body, while the National Environmental Protection
Agency may also be involved where energy, including electricity-related, operations
impact the environment.
Key national policy blueprints include the 2008 National Strategy for
Sustainable Development – Horizons 2013-2020-2030,109 the 2014-2020 National
Strategy for Research, Development, and Innovation, the 2010 National Renewable
Energy Action Plan,110 the 2016 National Energy Strategy 2016-2030 with an
Outlook to 2050 (NES 2016-2030),111 the 2018 National Energy Strategy 2019-2030
with an Outlook to 2050, and the National Strategy on Climate Change and Low
Carbon Economic Growth 2016-2030. Aspects of the National Action Plan 20162020 on Climate Change also have implications for energy policy.112
Furthermore, a key policy blueprint is Romania’s Integrated National
Energy and Climate Change Plan 2021-2030 (“NECP”),113 which all Member States
are required to develop for the period in question. Incidentally, NECPs must be
specific in their content in relation to how Member States seek to implement EU
targets by 2030 including greenhouse gas emissions (“GHGs”) by 40% below 1990
levels, a RES share of at least 32% regarding their total energy consumption, and
increased energy efficiency across their economy. Furthermore, NECPs are
structured in a manner to address and are assessed against, the following set of policy
objectives: decarbonization; energy efficiency; energy security; the internal energy
market; and research, innovation and competitiveness (“RIC”). Furthermore,
Member States are required to consult neighboring EU peers and the European
108. See generally Leal-Arcas & Filis, supra note 1, at 1225–1300 (It is worth noting that while the
distribution of competences is a question concerning the constitutive instruments that establish and
empower the EU, there is scope for EU Member States – on the basis of subsequent agreement and/or
acquiescence – to allow greater leeway on an ad hoc basis to the collective and supranational bodies of
the EU to formulate policy and/or act in other ways. In that sense, outside the strictly
constitutional/normative context within the parameters of treaty law, action may also, and indeed does,
take place within the context of diplomacy and politics to the extent that there is sufficient political will
on the part of the EU28 to look beyond legal and technical formalities concerning vires.).
109. See generally U.N. DEV. PRGM , GOV. OF ROM., National Sustainable Development Strategy:
Romania 2013-2020-2030 (2008).
110. See generally NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN [NREAP] (2010) (Rom).
111. See generally ROMANIAN MINISTRY OF ENERGY, ENERGY STRATEGY OF ROM. 2016-2030, WITH
THE PROSPECT OF THE YEAR 2050 (2016) (Rom).
112. See MINISTRY OF ENV’T, MULTILATERAL ASSESSMENT ROM., at 9 (2019) (Rom).
113. See generally NECP, supra note 39.
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Commission. Should the proposed NECP fall short of EU objectives, the European
Commission may issue specific recommendations.
In the event, following the submission of the Romanian NECP on 31
December 2018, the European Commission carried out a comprehensive review and
recommended (cf. Figure 3), among other things, that the Romanian government be
more ambitious re its 2030 RES share target to at least 34% of total energy
consumption, be more specific in its various implementation policies and measures,
simplify its licensing and permit procedures concerning RES self-generation, be
more ambitious in relation to reducing its 2030 primary and final energy
consumption levels, define prospective targets for greater wholesale and retail
market integration and liquidity regionally, and specify its national research,
innovation, and competitiveness objectives, along with other action to provide the
requisite coherence and clarity for attracting investments.114
Figure 2: Commission assessment of key objectives as appear in Romania’s draft
NECP

Source: European Commission115
1.4 Other Considerations
As mentioned earlier, Romania enjoys a relatively privileged position in
being among the least energy-dependent EU Member States,116 and its natural
114. See C (2019) 4423 final, supra note 79, at 4-6.
115. See generally EUR. COMMISSION, ENERGY STATISTICS (2018).
116. See generally Member States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment, 2013 O.J.
(145)
239,
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resource wealth, along with increasing use of nuclear and RES in recent years,
suggest that this may remain the case for decades to come. In fact, Romania’s
plentiful and varied RES – principally in relation to biomass, geothermal,
hydropower, solar and wind potential – are distributed throughout its territory and
are amenable to wide-scale exploitation once investment-related conditions (e.g.,
profitability v. infrastructure costs) are more favorable to investors.117
What is more, Romania is the largest producer of oil and gas in Central and
Eastern Europe, and, as such, is placed and equipped well to become a key player in
the European oil and gas market further to new discoveries in the Black Sea.118 That
said, Romania remains among the most energy- and carbon-intensive economies of
the EU,119 and, consequently, among the five most vulnerable EU members despite
its low energy dependence.120 Moreover, Romania lags behind in terms of highquality infrastructure – namely, it holds the second-worst score in the EU as to
perceptions concerning infrastructure quality – with underdeveloped basic transport
infrastructure having a bottleneck effect for other types of infrastructure and policy
objectives.121
Furthermore, confidence and trust on the part of the Romanian public in
public authorities and businesses to protect and respect its consumer rights and
interests, respectively, are low.122 For instance, Romania scores well below the EU
average in many key areas of governance in terms of public perceptions concerning,
among other things, the quality of public services, policy-making and
implementation, the rule of law, government effectiveness and accountability, and
credibility of government’s commitment to policies.123 Such indicators could lead to
an apathetic/indifferent, if not cynical, public, that might be less likely to actively
participate in smart grid-related and broader energy efficiency efforts. Tangible
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf (Romania
is considered one of the least energy-imports dependent EU members particularly in relation to electricity
for which it is a net exporter. Romania’s energy import dependence was 23% for 2008-2012 (cf. 29% in
2006) v. an EU28 average of 54%, and its energy mix is one of the most diversified in the EU); cf. Member
States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment, 2014 O.J. (196) 6,
https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/pdf/ocp196_en.pdf.
117. See Cîrstea et al., supra note 8, at 2, 5.
118. See Black Sea Oil & Gas to Go Ahead With $400 million Romanian Offshore Project, REUTERS
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-romania-energy-gas/black-sea-oil-gas-to-go-aheadwith-400-million-romanian-offshore-project-idUSKCN1PW0M1; Black Sea Oil & Gas Confirms
Potential of Romania’s Offshore Dacian Play, OIL & GAS J. (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.ogj.com/exploration-development/discoveries/article/17295777/black-sea-oil-gas-confirmspotential-of-romanias-offshore-dacian-play (Noting a recent USD 400 million offshore project likely to
result in c. 10 billion cubic metres of gas. The joint venture involves Black Sea Oil & Gas (BSOG) (NB.,
controlled by the Carlyle Group LP and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development), Italian
producer Gas Plus International B.V., and Petro Ventures Resources).
119. See Macroeconomic Imbalances Country Report, 2015 O.J. (223) 27 (The CO2 intensity of
Romania’s economy is more than twice the EU average, while its energy intensity is among the five
highest in the EU, partially due to energy inefficiency, the high proportion of energy-intensive industries
in the economy, and the size of the share of fossil fuels in energy consumption.).
120. See Member States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment, 2013 O.J. (145) 23033, https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf.
121. See 2015 O.J. (223), supra note 119, at 26.
122. Id. at 69.
123. Id. at 66-69.
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benefits must accrue to such a public to secure effective buy-in levels on its part. As
alluded to earlier, the implications of RES promotion for household electricity prices
(namely, retail price hikes) could run in the opposite direction whereby citizens qua
consumers remain cynical and insufficiently motivated to participate in any national
drive aimed at the smartening of Romania’s grid.
Lastly, two distinct yet interrelated issues – namely, energy poverty and the
need to protect vulnerable consumers – often feature in policy-making surrounding
electricity. More recently, the government has affirmed its commitment to protecting
vulnerable consumers by maintaining, and, if necessary, extending, the class of
beneficiaries who may not be disconnected – particularly during the cold season –
and by extending smart metering by 2028 at the latest.124 To that end, the government
states that among non-financial measures, it aims to develop a clear legal and
political framework that approaches energy poverty as a “cumulation of factors of
which the most important is income-related . . . [and in which] [t]he concept
‘vulnerable consumer’ [is] defined in an integrated way [that] include[s] all the
factors that may cause vulnerability: commercial behavior, market design, structural
factors and access to energy, the consumer’s individual situation and sociodemographic factors”.125
2. How ‘Smart’ is Romania’s Grid?
EU Member States, including Romania, are legally obligated to encourage
the modernization of their transmission and distribution networks, including
optimizing their electricity grids, aimed at the decarbonization, decentralization,
interconnectedness, and greater efficiency of the national electricity system as a
means of achieving optimally integrated and efficient national, regional, and EUwide energy systems – systems upon which, in turn, the energy security and
economic resilience of EU Member States rest. The European Commission’s Energy
2020 Communication126 contains a number of priorities including the integration of
electricity systems, the fostering of technological and innovative developments,
energy security and affordability, and the empowerment of consumers to such
ends.127 The various aspects of Romania’s smart-grid policy and practice are
explored separately below.
2.1 Smart Grid Investment, and Research and Development
Romania’s expenditure on research, development, and innovation (“RDI”)
is considerably below the EU average, and the European Commission has described
its performance as “stagnant” with low technological outputs.128 Developments such
as those discussed in the foregoing may necessitate greater policy focus on the part
of the government to enhance RDI capacities and the take-up of advanced
technologies across Romania’s territory in line with the EU’s Catching Up Regions
124. See NECP, supra note 39, at 74.
125. Id. at 104.
126. Commission Communication for Energy 2020 “A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and
Secure Energy”, COM (2010) 639 final (Nov. 10, 2010).
127. Id.
128. See SWD (2019) 1022 final, supra note 26, at 73-74.
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Initiative, given that currently Romania also performs considerably below the EU
average in relation to digitalization across various fields including the private, public,
and third sectors.129
Furthermore, it is not just infrastructural adjustments that are necessary but
also regulatory tweaking, particularly in relation to cyber-security, including privacy
and data protection issues that may arise,. In relation to infrastructural adjustments,
these may involve retrofitting existing systems or even their costly replacement,
which, in turn, may require a substantial capital investment that is not always
forthcoming through market means, should the levels of return be insufficiently
profitable. In such cases, intervention may be necessary to stimulate favorable
market conditions through financial and non-financial incentives. A case in point has
been the incentivization of RES electricity generation through the GCs scheme that
resulted in the exponential expansion of RES electricity generation capacity. 130
At any rate, government policy has a role to play in developing regulatory
and other conditions that foster the requisite certainty and predictability for the
purposes of investors. In the case of Romania, certain regulatory and policy
adjustments131 have undermined investor confidence concerning RES
investments.132 Currently, the level of investment to attain Romania’s National
Energy Strategy objectives stands at c. EUR 22 billion for the 2021-2030 period.133
All the assurances practicable and appropriate on the part of the Romanian
government would have to be offered to investors and market participants to attract
such sorely needed investment.
In the case of Romania, while deep structural reforms of its energy sector –
including electricity – have entirely changed the landscape by going from the entirely
vertically-integrated bureaucratic governance of energy towards total unbundled
marketisation and liberalisation, its electricity infrastructure (discussed earlier) is of
low and aging quality.134 Consequently, the state of such infrastructure is subpar visà-vis one expected of a functional “smart” grid system.
Lastly, Romania is among the countries in which EU funding seems to
provide the bulk (over 60%) of smart-grid-related investments,135 which, again, may
suggest to prospective investors that smart grid development does not feature
prominently within Romania’s policy agenda. As a consequence, this could
potentially discourage private investment should the state be seen insufficiently
focused on this field. What is more, uncertainty and the lack of specificity in policy,

129. Id.
130. Cf. GUȘILOV, supra note 41.
131. See WBG, supra note 71; Cîrstea et al., supra note 8; see also Gușilov, supra note 41 (Adjustments
to the GC scheme (discussed earlier) which investors saw as moving the goal posts).
132. See Chioncelet al.,supra note 36, at 1, 5, 6, 7.
133. See NECP, supra note 39, at 163 (stating that EUR 105 billion are needed for “energy demand,”
9 billion for the power grid, 12 billion for power plants, and 1 billion for steam boilers).
134. See 2015 O.J. (223), supra note 119, at 26.
135. See Flavia Gangale et al, Smart Grid Projects Outlook 2017: Facts, Figures and Trends in Europe
2017 JRC SCI. POL’Y REP. (EUR 28614 EN) 31.
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objectives, and measures, has been seen as potentially discouraging investments,136
and the European Commission has recommended that this be addressed.137
2.2 RES Electricity Generation and Self-Generation
Romania’s progress in relation to increasing the share of RES in total
energy production and electricity generation is remarkable. The bulk of RES
electricity is generated commercially across various plants throughout the country.138
However, self-generation on the part of consumers (prosumers in this regard)
remains rather weak. This is at odds with the European Commission’s Clean Energy
Package, which, among other things, seeks to make households active participants
in the electricity system and to decentralize electricity generation by, among other
things, encouraging residential electricity generation, storage, and consumption realtime data sharing (e.g., re smart metering).139 In terms of financial incentives, there
is support (up to a maximum of 90% of purchase costs) available for photovoltaic
(“PV”) solutions.140 Moreover, grid operators are required not only to connect RES
electricity producers to their grids but to also prioritize the transmission of their
output141. This obligation includes the requirement to develop the grid should it be
necessary to connect RES electricity producers to it.142 By 2018 there were 774
accredited producers: 67 concerning wind, 103 hydro of installed capacity of no more
than 10 MW, 576 solar, and 28 concerning biomass and waste.143 In 2017, their
collective installed electricity generation capacity stood at 4,787 MW.144
Further support exists in relation to the GC scheme (briefly mentioned
earlier) however this was discontinued by 2017 for new entrants, therefore, making
new investments in RES – save for projects co-financed by European Structural
Funds – less likely for the 2017-2020 period. The GC scheme had previously
stimulated the necessary investments that resulted in an expansion of installed
capacity by 30 MWh in 2012 alone.145 As demand for GCs far exceeded initial
expectations, in 2013 shortly after launching the scheme, ANRE sought to amend it
by reducing the number of certificates issued per MWh generated, citing price
affordability issues.146 Access to the scheme was closed entirely for new entrants by
136. See SWD (2019) 1022 final, supra note 26, at 9, 19 (.).
137. See C (2019) 4423 final, supra note 79, at 4-5. 4, 5.
138. See ANRE, supra note 19, at 33.
139. See European Commission Press Release IP/19/1836, Clean Energy for All Europeans:
Commission Welcomes European Parliament’s Adoption of New Electricity Market Design Proposals
(Mar. 26, 2019).
140. See Cristina Blajin, LEGAL RESOURCES ON RENEWABLE ENERGY: PROMOTION IN ROMANIA,
(Jan. 18, 2019), http://www.res-legal.eu/en/search-by-country/romania/tools-list/c/romania/s/rese/t/promotion/sum/184/lpid/183/ [hereinafter RES LEGAL].
141. See ANRE, supra note 19, at 33. (Network access guaranteed to RES electricity generators.
Access prioritised for RES generators contracted to sell at a regulated price (e.g., power plant capacity no
more than 1 MW or for high efficiency biomass cogeneration, of no more than 2 MW per plant)).
142. See id. at 4, 32.
143. See id. at 4, 32. 33.
144. See id.
145. Cf. Cîrstea et al., supra note 8, at 13.
146. IEA, https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/romania/name-33751-en.php (last visited
Dec. 20, 2019).
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2017, and this rather rapid phase-out caused a significant drop in subsequent
investments.147 What is more, there was some blowback in terms of investors filing
suits against the state for compensation.148 That said, the scheme remains in effect
for those licensed before 2017 for up to 2031.149 Note however that it is open to new
participants to seek support through Romania’s National Rural Development
Programme.150
Under the limited GC scheme, electricity producers and suppliers must
present a certain number of GCs issued for power generated from RES.151 However,
issues have marred the GC scheme and in April 2018 ANRE announced that a new
RES support scheme was to be developed for 2021 onwards and that it was most
likely to be based on a feed-in tariff (“FiT”) model.152 What is more, according to
the latest update available online, while legislation enables the introduction of FiT
for <500 kW producers, the implementing policy has yet to be thrashed out, and as
a consequence, the FiT scheme has yet to come into effect.153 Residential prosumers
had been overlooked when it came to the FiT scheme, which in practice only
benefited large-scale RES electricity producers who feed power into the grid. 154 This
had been most incongruent to efforts to smarten the national grid that small-scale
RES producers (c. <100 kW) – e.g., a household with a PV roof installation – may
not feed excess power generated into the grid and receive payment for it due to
bureaucratic reasons (e.g., indecision on the part of the state concerning the
applicable tax regime). Consequently, Romanian prosumers would feed into the grid
any excess power generated without receiving any remuneration. 155
The above led the government and parliament to contemplate solutions and
this resulted in the adoption of Law No. 184/2018 establishing the system for
promoting the production of energy from renewable sources of energy.156 This law
includes a number of measures aimed at prosumer support, including a support
scheme is available to prosumers of an installed capacity of <27 kW per household;
crucially, the possibility to sell has been extended to such prosumers and their
suppliers are obligated to purchase that excess power generated; prosumers are
exempt from excise duty concerning the amount they produce and self-consume, and

147. Cîrstea et al., supra note 8, at 13, 18; see also Gușilov, supra note 41, at 4.
148. Gușilov, supra note 41, at 5.
149. Blajin, supra note 140.
150. Id.
151. See also id.; ANRE, supra note 19, at 4, 32.
152. Gușilov, supra note 41, at 4.
153. Blajin, supra note 140.
154. Cf. Gușilov, supra note 41, at 4.
155. Id.
156. Legea nr. 184/2018 Pentru Aprobarea Ordonanței de Urgență a Guvernului nr. 24/2017 Privind
Modificarea Si Completarea Legii nr. 220/2008 Pentru Stabilirea Sistemului de Promovare a Producerii
Energiei Din Surse Regenerabile de Energie Si Pentru Modificarea Unor Acte Normative [Law No.
184/2018 for the Approval of Government Emergency Ordinance No. 24/2017 Regarding the Amendment
and Completion of the Law No. 220/2008 Establishing the System for the Promotion of Energy Production
from Renewable Energy Sources and for the Amendment of Some Normative Acts], (July 23, 2018),
https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gi4dsmjqgyya/legea-nr-184-2018-pentru-aprobarea-ordonantei-de-urgenta-aguvernului-nr-24-2017-privind-modificarea-si-co
mpletarea-legii-nr-220-2008-pentru-stabilireasistemului-de-promovare-a-producerii-energiei-di.
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the amount they sell to suppliers; and prosumers are exempt from the obligation to
purchase GCs.157 As a consequence of these measures, the government considers that
by 2030, from the total installed power capacity for solar, 750 MW will be prosumerowned capacity.158
2.3 Smart metering
Romania is among the sixteen Member States (alongside Austria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) that are likely to proceed with the large-scale
roll-out of smart meters by 2020.159 Its cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) has indicated
positive outcomes.160 In fact, the government considers smart metering as a means
of increasing energy efficiency161 and has gone as far as to state that smart metering
‘must be a national priority’ and a fundamental step towards the digitalization of the
grid. It aims to entirely replace conventional metering with smart metering by
2029.162
The latest available figures indicate that smart metering has been extended
to c. 443,000 end-users. This represents c. 4.8% of the 9.24 million low-voltage
consumers.163 The overall cost of smart metering to date has been c. EUR 34.8
million (c. RON 164.8 million) while the cost per unit is c. EUR 78 (c. RON 372).164
2.4 Zero- and low-emissions mobility
In the EU, transport, for the most part, depends on oil (c. 94% of energy
needs) and produces a quarter of all carbon emissions, of which 70% pertains to road
transport.165 In Romania transport generates c. 35% of emissions.166 EU goals
concerning the decarbonization of transport are predicated on the promotion of low
emissions mobility, including electric vehicles (“EVs”). While greater take-up of
EVs may place strains on the electricity system, likely developments in demand
response and storage solutions could neutralize, if not outshine, any such effects.
EV take-up in Romania is distinctly low with fewer than fifty vehicles sold
in 2015.167 In fact it would appear that cumulatively, by 2017, Romania’s stock of
plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) was c. 669, which represents a market share of
157. NECP, supra note 39, at 89.
158. Id.
159. Commission Report Benchmarking Smart Metering Deployment in the EU-27 With a Focus on
Electricity, at 4, COM (2014) 356 final (June 17, 2014).
160. Id.
161. NECP, supra note 39, at 18.
162. Id. at 88.
163. Cf. ANRE, supra note 19, at 9, 76.
164. Id.
165. Report of the Commission Expert Group on Electricity Interconnection Targets, Towards a
Sustainable
and
Integrated
Europe,
at
20
(Nov.
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/report_of_the_commission_expert_group_on_ele
ctricity_interconnection_targets.pdf.
166. Cf. Gheorghe Badea et al., Design and Simulation of Romanian Solar Energy Charging Station
for Electric Vehicles, 12 Energies 1, 1 (2018).
167. Eur. Env’t Agency Report, Electric Vehicles in Europe, at 47 EEA (2016) 20 (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/electric-vehicles-in-europe.
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<0.1% concerning the total stock of passenger cars – cf. this to regional EU peers
including Austria (14,854, c. 0.3%), Bulgaria (118, <0.1%), the Czech Republic
(1,721, <0.1%), Germany (124,191, c. 0.3%), Greece (341, <0.1%), Hungary (567,
<0.1%), Poland (976, 0.1%), and Slovakia (568, 0.1%, respectively).168
However, more positively, Romania is among countries that apply cofunding for low-emissions vehicle purchases.169 In fact, EV buyers have benefited
under the Romanian RABLA Clasic and Plus subsidy grant schemes to the tune of
EUR 11,500 for individual EV purchases.170 What is more, EV buyers in Romania
are exempt from registration tax and fees,171 and there are some emissions-based
reductions concerning road tax,172 which goes some way to incentivize EV take-up.
The situation is less sanguine in terms of charging points. Directive
2014/94/EU commits Member States to establish sufficient charging points available
to the public by 31 December 2020.173 In lieu of specific targets, a sensible rule-ofthumb offered is one point for every ten vehicles in circulation.174 The current
number of publicly accessible charging points nationally appears to be c. 140,175
while a 2018 study placed this at c. 114 – cf. this to Austria (4,088), Bulgaria (94),
the Czech Republic (684), Germany (10,878), Greece (38), Hungary (272), Poland
(552), and Slovakia (443).176 This is woefully low. While, on its face, it exceeds the
10:1 ratio mentioned in the foregoing, this is misleading as the ratio is merely
indicative than account for the necessary baseline number of charging points – in
other words, the basic minimum infrastructure – that one could reasonably expect to
be installed across the territory of a particular country simply to make EV use
possible, particularly when one considers the limitations on EV range vis-à-vis
conventionally-fuelled vehicles. This is particularly disheartening given that the
availability of charging points is, in fact, among the most influential factors behind
EV purchase decisions.177
Moreover, the lack of proper coverage concerning fast-charging points
along highways inhibits prospective EV buyer and existing EV owner/user

168. Matthias Spöttle et al., Research for Tran Committee – Charging Infrastructure for Electric Road
Vehicles, TRAN COMMITTEE 11 (2018).
169. EEA, supra note 170, at 60.
170. Răzvan Scăeșteanu, RABLA Plus: Cum îți Iei Mașină Electrică Nouă Cu Mai Puțin de 11.000
Euro, ROMÂNIA LIBERĂ, [RABLA Plus: How Do You Get a New Electric Car for Less than 11,000 Euros]
(May 24, 2017), https://romanialibera.ro/stiinta-tehnologie/auto/rabla-plus--cum-iti-iei-masina-electricanoua-cu-mai-putin-de-11-000-euro-451000 (For instance, in relation to the lowest priced EV model
mentioned in that news article – namely, the Smart For Two coupé electric drive at EUR 22,078 – a buyer
benefiting from the RABLA subsidy would only have to contribute EUR 10,578.).
171. José M. Cansino et al., Policy Instruments to Promote Electro-Mobility in the EU28: A
Comprehensive Review, 10 Sustainability 6 (2018).
172. Spöttle et al., supra note 168, at 36, 44, 115.
173. Council Directive 2014/94, of October 22, 2014, Deployment of Alternative Fuels Infrastructure,
2014 O.J. (L 307) 1, 12.
174. Id. at 4.
175. THE CHARGEMAP, https://chargemap.com/map (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (Charging stations
map for electric cars).
176. Spöttle et al., supra note 168, at 11.
177. Cf. Cansino et al., supra note 171, at 21-22; cf. TRANSPORT & ENVIRONMENT, Roll-out of Public
EV Charging Infrastructure in the EU: Is the Chicken and Egg Dilemma Resolved? (2001) at 5.
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confidence in relation to longer distances beyond the range of EVs that operate solely
on stored electricity/batteries. This further disincentivizes EV proliferation given that
potential buyers may be discouraged by the unavailability of essential charging
infrastructure. While there are c. 2,550 fast-charging sites across the road networks
of the EU 28 and Norway with about 5,000 chargers – on average two chargers at
every 60km on EU motorways for either direction of travel – this is patchy, as
coverage in Romania, as is the case for regional peers including Bulgaria, Greece,
and Hungary, remains poor,178 although regional plans have been agreed that would
also benefit Romania.179
As mentioned earlier, Romanian infrastructure is generally of low quality,
particularly for transport (including, roads and rail), and electricity supply, 180 let
alone for charging point installations, and this has lasting implications for the
proliferation of low- and zero-emissions mobility options unless the government
purposely focuses on reversing this situation.
2.5 Storage
As stated passim, Romania’s electricity infrastructure is of relatively low
quality, however, there are plans to update it progressively in line with broader
efforts aimed at national, regional, and EU energy efficiency. In that sense, current
storage capacity remains underdeveloped. However, Romania intends to develop
electricity storage capacity via hydroelectric pumping systems, and develop capacity
and mechanisms to integrate intermittent RES generation into the national system
and in electrical accumulator systems including the small storage capacity at the level
of prosumers. Also, in line with energy mix diversification objectives, the
government seeks to encourage storage and aggregated production between multiple
producers and prosumers.181
What is more, plans include the development of battery energy storage
systems in the national power system at a capacity of >400MW, chiefly as a means
of flattening the load curve and providing an additional exploitable reserve. 182 A
discrete project – namely, Intelligent Electricity Grid and Renewable Energy
Systems – seems to be underway in Alba-Iulia concerning providing an integrated
approach to high-capacity energy storage and RES electricity generation.183
Incidentally, it is worth highlighting the implications that EV proliferation
may have for the electricity system including storage objectives, other than the
positive decarbonization effects that low emissions make possible. For instance, EV
batteries could be seen as a dispersed storage system to better utilize excess power
produced by intermittent sources, and, generally, to better manage demand peaks.
EV users could be incentivized through dynamic tariff systems to charge their
vehicles when it is most advantageous for the purposes of demand management and
to thus lead to greater efficiencies all around including to users and consumers in

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 19.
2015 O.J. (223), supra note 119, at 26.
Cf. NECP, supra note 39, at 14, 87.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 153.
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relation to savings accruing to them.184 In that sense, EV proliferation could go in
hand with, and further bolster, storage capacity development and demand response
efforts.
2.6 Demand Response
Briefly put, Demand Response (“DR”), within the context of greater energy
efficiency, pertains to policies – typically through some tariff or program – aimed at
incentivizing changes in electricity consumption patterns in response to changes in
the price of electricity over time or to incentivize payments aimed at inducing lower
electricity use during high price periods or when grid reliability is unstable.185
Under the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU)186 Member States are
required not only to remove whatever disincentives to overall energy efficiency in
generation, transmission, distribution, and supply of electricity may exist, or that
may hamper participation in DR, but to also ensure that network operators are
incentivized to improve energy efficiency including DR.187 Further provisions
require that Member States take particular regulatory and technical steps to facilitate
DR and DR participants.188 The requirements of Art 15 could be arranged in four
themes – namely, DR should be encouraged to participate within aspects of the
electricity market in a way that supply does; TSOs and DSOs must treat DR
providers – including aggregators – in a non-discriminatory manner and on the basis
of their technical capabilities; national regulators should set clear technical rules and
modalities for DR providers’ market participation; and that specifications should
enable aggregators.189
Turning to the situation in Romania, demand responsiveness is limited to
such levels possible within the parameters of the existing – basic and aging –
infrastructure. While legislation legally enables DR, as is the case with other EU
Member States including Hungary – DR is not taking place due to a variety of
technical, structural, and historical barriers including the fact that the Romanian
electricity system has historically been supply-driven, with further supply being
added to cover full demand, than involve DR as a means of managing end-user
behavior.
What is more, the generally limited nature of smart metering is also
hampering DR objectives as end-users/consumers lack the immediate tools that
facilitate more cost-savvy electricity use.190 That said, an important non-technical
barrier concerning DR – namely, subsidized/below cost electricity pricing – has for
the most part been removed, considering the total deregulation of electricity tariffs
resulting in a 100% competitive and liberalised market. As a consequence, end-users
are more likely to keep an eye on their electricity use and to thus avoid energy
inefficiency.
184. Cf. Cansino et al., supra note 171, at 22.
185. Bertoldi et al., supra note 77, at 2.
186. Council Directive 2012/27/EU of Oct. 25, 2012, Energy Efficiency, Amending Directives
2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and Repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, 2012 O.J. (L 315).
187. Id. at 22.
188. Id. at 23.
189. Bertoldi et al., supra note 77, at iii-iv.
190. Id. at 96-101.
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Lastly, the government lists demand responsiveness among its national
objectives pertaining to the flexibility of the national energy system. In line with the
aforementioned, Commission’s policy this is to be achieved principally through the
imposition of obligations of the TSO and DSOs to provide dynamic pricing/tariffs to
further incentivize end-user orderly and ‘smarter’ consumption.191
2.7 Additional ‘smart’ solutions
ANRE has developed online tools for retail customers to be able to compare
electricity (and gas) offers through impartial platforms.192 This may be advantageous
to consumers who become better equipped to shop around and make smarter, better
informed, choices that, in turn, may have positive implications for energy use, DR,
and, overall, energy efficiency. In relation to ‘Smart Cities’ objectives, some limited
action is also contemplated – namely, plans by local authorities in Bucharest and
Cluj-Napoca – chiefly involving RES heat and power generation projects using
photovoltaic panels, thermal solar panels and/or biomass.193
2.8 Cyber-security, Privacy, and Data Protection
As becomes apparent with the foregoing, efforts to “smarten” electricity
networks are multifaceted as they may involve the development and application of
diverse technologies capable of optimizing electricity systems in a variety of ways,
and in relation to their various aspects – e.g., generation, transmission, distribution,
storage, use, etc. Much that pertains to developing optimal energy networks,
including smart grids, has to do with dynamic processes such as those that allow the
flow of relevant information – not just power – between all connected participants
including power generators (including ‘prosumers’), TSOs, DSOs, traders,
consumers etc. For instance, systems could be fitted with artificial intelligence
(“AI”) and Internet-of-Things (“IoT”) capabilities to feed back key information.
Such data flows may promote, among other things, greater responsiveness across the
system, which could result in greater efficiencies for all concerned.
In the case of Romania, the government is taking some modest steps aimed
to increasing the flexibility of its electricity system via including its digitalization to
facilitate intelligent grids and active consumers and prosumers.194 The government
sees this central to increasing RES electricity generation and to transforming the
energy sector overall to become “fit-for-RES”.195 To that end, Romania intends to
digitalise the transmission, distribution, and consumption aspects of electricity, to
introduce IoT and AI in transmission and distribution management, and better
integrate distributed production systems and prosumers into the grid, although it has
not specified how and by when these are to be achieved.196
191. Cf. NECP, supra note 39, at 71, 73.
192. Cf. ANRE, Comparator Oferte-tip de Furnizare a Energiei Electrice, [Electricity Cost
Comparisons], http://www.anre.ro/ro/info-consumatori/comparator-de-tarife; ANRE, Comparator
Oferte-tip de Furnizare a Gazelor Naturale, [Gas Cost Comparisons] http://www.anre.ro/ro/infoconsumatori/comparator-oferte-tip-de-furnizare-a-gn.
193. NECP, supra note 39, at 67.
194. Id. at 88.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 15.

144

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 60.1

Such technological solutions may give rise to new challenges. While
smarter grids featuring greater interactivity, efficiencies, decentralization, and
degrees of “democratization” (e.g., consumer and prosumer empowerment) may
enhance energy security and lead to a less impregnable electricity system overall due
to its decentralized nature – e.g., less susceptible to terrorist shutdown and so on –
on the other hand, the decentralized and digitalized nature of such systems may, in
fact, make them more porous/vulnerable at various junctures. For instance, their
information technology management infrastructure and processes could become
vulnerable. Compromised data flows may not only result in data leaks and misuse
but also to incapacitating systemic failure/shutdown. What is more, such smart
systems are not only vulnerable to the set of physical and natural attacks or disasters
as is also the case with conventional/basic infrastructure, but also to cyber-attacks
targeting the smart aspects of more sophisticated electricity infrastructure. In that
sense, governments must be fully cognisant of, and prepared for, such types of risk.
The Romanian government is certainly aware of these risks, however, its
action plan perhaps lacks the detail that such risks warrant. For instance, it lists the
need to deal with these risks by merely stating that cyber-security of the grid control
systems is/will be addressed by “re-enforcing protection barriers and international
cooperation”.197
In relation to smart grid-related technologies involved in the electricity grid,
other issues also arise. For instance, concerning smart meters, interoperability
between terminals at either end of the distribution network – typically, between the
end user and the distributor/supplier – allows for the exchange of data including those
pertaining to user consumption. Such data gathering and processing are subject to
national and EU data protection rules as they involve such data, which on their own
strength or combined with other data, could lead to the identification of natural
persons.198
As is the case with all EU Member States, the principal source of EU-wide
data regulation and protection in Romania is Regulation 2016/679, which regulates
the processing by an individual, a company, or an organization of personal data
relating to individuals in the EU.199 At the EU level, under data protection rules,
personal data may be collected and processed to the extent that there is consent on
the part of the “data subject” – i.e., the individual to whom the data pertain – or some
other applicable ground therein, including to the extent that processing is necessary
to execute a contract involving the data subject, ensure compliance with legal
requirements, or to protect the vital and/or legitimate interests of third parties.200
What may constitute personal data remains an objective question that turns on

197. Cf. id. at 15, 97.
198. See DLA PIPER, Data Protection Laws of the World: Romania, (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=RO (Ssummarizing data regulation in
Romania. Note that this essentially amounts to Law No. 190/2018 which implements EU rules discussed
below).
199. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of April 27, 2016, Protection of Natural Persons With Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data on the Free Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation) [hereinafter GDPR], 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
200. Id. at 36.
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whether the information relates to an identified or identifiable natural person.201
Under the current rules, it is possible to circumvent the requirement for consent or
the other applicable grounds in so far as the data are truly anonymised as this would
rule out the possibility of the identification of the data subject in question. Extra care
should be taken to ensure that the data are entirely anonymized and not
pseudonymized – i.e., potentially attributable to a natural person by recourse to
additional information.202
In relation to smart metering and other smart grid-related technologies,
consumer/user consent to personal data gathering and processing could be sought
from the outset accompanied by the necessary assurances that all data gathered will
be processed in line with legislation – that is that processing will be for the purposes
upon which consent is offered – for instance, in relation to smart metering, to
facilitate real-time cost estimates, to analyze consumption patterns, to ensure supply
efficiency, to plan electricity generation and supply, and so on. There may be some
skepticism on the part of consumers particularly in Romania where, as mentioned
earlier, confidence in government and business practices is rather low. 203 That said,
the Romanian government should not be dissuaded from seeking to dispel possible
misperceptions at play. To that end, it may seek to raise awareness of the robust
legislative framework in place for data handling and protection, and of the perceived
benefits of smart metering particularly for the purposes of households to keep track
of energy use and expenditure.
III. THE CASE OF MALTA
1. Introduction
Decentralization and decarbonization of the energy sector have
been slow in Malta as the country, being a small island, has unique challenges that
differ from other European Union (“EU”) countries, including a high population
density,204 limited available land space, and ever-increasing electricity demand.205
These challenges are influenced by the geographical features of the country. 206 The
small size of the electricity market, in particular, is a major constraint to
decentralising the energy sector and yet recent records show an increase in energy
consumption.207

201. Id. at 33.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Cf. 2015 O.J. (223), supra note 119, at 69.
204. The Maltese Islands have a land surface area of 316 km2 and a population density of 1,260
persons per km2; one of the highest in the world.
205. Busuttil Antoine et al., Energy Scenarios for Malta, 33 INT’L J. HYDROGEN ENERGY, 4235, 4235,
4238-4239 (2008).
206. By geographical description, Malta is an archipelago of three islands and four islets right in the
centre of the Mediterranean Sea.
207. Although the electricity market is small, we note that during the summer, greater peak electricity
demands are experienced basically due to increased air-conditioning loads and this causes an added load
on the electricity distribution system that have resulted in complete power failure for few times.
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For instance, on July 9, 2019, the demand for electricity supply reached
510MW, which is the highest level ever recorded by Enemalta plc.208 This is an
increase of slightly less than 5% when compared to the highest ever rate registered
before, namely that of 488MW in August 2017.209 We also note that the demand for
electricity supply was 15% higher than the demand registered in the same period
during the past two years.210
With respect to greenhouse gas emissions, although there have been global
and regional efforts to reduce these emissions, Malta is still lagging behind its EU
targets.211 At the EU level, in 2016, the region achieved a reduction in GHG
emissions of 22.4 % below 1990 levels.212 Approximated estimates for emissions in
2017 indicate an increase of emissions of 0.6 % compared with 2016.213 At the
national level, recent data shows that Malta has the second highest increase in carbon
dioxide emissions from 2017 to 2018 mainly attributed to the transport sector.214
Indeed, Malta was one of the only eight countries to register an increase.215 The
country registered an increase of 6.7 per cent, second only to Latvia, which registered
an increase of 8.5 per cent.216 There is no doubt that the decarbonization of the energy
sector has been a marked feature of the 21st century, not only in Europe but also in
other parts of the globe.
Although Malta continues to register poor performance in tackling
emissions in the EU, the country has nevertheless put massive efforts in
decarbonizing its energy sector since joining the EU in 2004. In this regard, many of
the EU Directives pertaining to energy and the environment have been transposed to
national legislation.217 With respect to greenhouse gas emissions, we note that the
main increases in emissions in Malta in recent years were evidenced in two particular
fields – Hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) and transport – and this is due to the
208. See ENEMALTA, About Us, https://www.enemalta.com.mt/about-us/ (“Enemalta was established
in 1977 and it is the leading energy services provider in the Maltese Islands, entrusted with the generation
and distribution of electricity, and the development of the national electricity distribution network.”);
ENEMALTA, Enemalta Registered the Highest Electric Demand, (June 10, 2019),
https://www.enemalta.com.mt/news/high-electricity-demand-registered/.
209. See ENEMALTA, Enemalta Registered the Highest Electric Demand, (June 10, 2019),
https://www.enemalta.com.mt/news/high-electricity-demand-registered/.
210. Id.
211. EEA, Trends and Projections in Europe 2018: Tracking Progress Towards Europe’s Climate and
Energy Targets, at 24, EEA (2018) 16 (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trendsand-projections-in-europe-2018-climate-and-energy#tab-data-references.
212. Id. at 9.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 30 (As will be discussed in this chapter, the country has embraced electric vehicles as
a way to decarbonize the transport sector. Albeit, a recent report from the European Environment Agency
indicated that Malta has the fourth worse air quality and a 12% increase of carbon dioxide in three years.).
215. Id. (Carbon dioxide emissions are a major contributor to global warming and account for around
80 per cent of all EU greenhouse gas emissions.).
216. See Denise Grech, Malta with Second Highest Increase in CO2 Emissions in Europe: Country
Continues to Register Poor Performance in Tackling Emissions, TIMES OF MALTA (May 8, 2019),
https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/malta-with-second-highest-increase-in-co2-emissions-ineurope.709402 (“On average, carbon dioxide emissions in European countries decreased by 2.5 per cent
between 2017 and 2018.”).
217. These will be explored in the next section.
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replacement of ozone depleting substances with F-gases in the use of refrigerators
and air conditioners.218
In energy terms, Malta is fully dependent on oil imports to supply its energy
needs.219 However, the island has the potential for renewable energy sources as it
enjoys an abundance of sunshine with a mean daily irradiance of 5 kWh/m2.220
Transitioning to a low carbon economy in Malta, therefore, will not only require
massive investments but it also requires attention to generation technology,
transmission, and end use efficiency, which will greatly attribute to a sustainable
environment.221 Moreover, this shift also will imply a structural shift in economic
activity wherein, energy-related investment and jobs will in part migrate from
traditional fossil fuel based activities towards services related to renewable energy.222
A clear strategy is also needed and, in this regard, Malta developed a Low
Carbon Development Strategy (“LCDS”) and its working on sector-specific
strategies.223 Despite these developments, it is imperative to note that in economic
terms, Malta is below the EU average with respect to employment directly or
indirectly related to renewable energy.224 For instance, in 2015, employment related
to renewable energy in Malta was at about 0.23%, below the EU average of 0.54%.225
The turnover of the renewable energy industry in the same year was estimated at
around EUR 0.035 billion, the largest part being attributed to photovoltaic (71.4%)
followed by biofuels and solar thermal industries in equal parts (14.29%).226
The efforts in transitioning to a low carbon economy in Malta are not only
apparent in the targeting of the decarbonization of the energy sector but also in the
need to address climate change. Just like other EU countries, Malta has also taken
efforts to tackle and adapt to climate change and in this respect, the country adopted
the Climate Action Act of 2015 and the 2012 Maltese National Adaption Strategy.227
Albeit the Climate Action Act requires the review and update of the strategy at least
every four years and there is also a need to focus on sectoral action plans like those
relating to natural ecosystems.
After this introduction, this section examines Malta’s electricity sector in
relation to the smartening of electricity systems. To that end, the article provides an

218. Commission
Energy
Union
Factsheet
Malta,
at
10
(Nov.
23,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/energy-union-factsheet-malta_en.pdf.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 14.
221. Antoine Busuttil et al., Energy Scenarios for Malta, 33 INT’L J. HYDROGEN ENERGY 4235-46
(2008).
222. Malta Factsheet, supra note 218, at 2.
223. MINISTRY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ENV’T & CLIMATE CHANGE, MALTA’S LOW CARBON
DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY
(2017)
(Malta),
https://meae.gov.mt/en/Public_Consultations/MSDEC/Documents/MSDEC%20LCDS%20Vision.PDF
(The LCDS initiative was in accordance with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and EU legislation. The LCDS considers the circumstances of the country especially
those aspects that link socio-economic development with climate action. Malta Low Carbon Development
Strategy, 2017).
224. Malta Factsheet, supra note 218, at 1.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 13.
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exposition of Malta’s electricity sector, includes an exposition of the “smart grid”related features of its network, and concludes with views for policymakers
concerning legal, regulatory, and other issues.
2. Energy Mix
Unlike most EU countries, the energy needs in Malta are mostly met by
imported fossil fuels, thus having an import dependency ratio of 97.3%. Albeit,
Malta is a significant player in the international trade of petroleum products.228
Although, 97% of the energy mix is dominated by petroleum, there has been an
increase in renewable energy generation, which enabled a decrease in petroleum
dominance from 99% to 97%.229 This reduction was not only made possible due to
renewable energy deployment but also the commissioned electricity interconnector
with Italy in early 2015, which enabled electricity imports from and through Italy of
1054 GWh in 2015.230 Additionally, the commissioning of the gas-fired plant in
April 2017 made it possible to introduce for the first time natural gas into Malta’s
energy mix.231
Although in the past renewable energy sources were not represented in the
energy mix, there have been some developments especially with respect to solar
energy, which has been made possible due to the favorable weather condition as the
Island enjoys an abundance of sunshine with a mean daily irradiance of 5kWh/m².
Table 1 highlights the summary of the energy profile in Malta.
Table 2: Malta Energy Profile232

228. Id. at 3.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 4.
232. INDEX
MUNDI,
Malta
Energy
https://www.indexmundi.com/malta/energy_profile.html.

Profile

(Dec.

7,

2019),
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As illustrated in the table above, Malta has no known oil reserves and, as
such, the country is dependent on imported fuels.233. Additionally, there is 0% of
electricity generated from nuclear fuels and hydroelectric plants. Unlike other EU
countries such as Poland, which are still heavily dependent on coal for electricity
production, in Malta the use of coal for power generation was terminated in 1995.234
The energy challenges to be addressed in Malta are stipulated in the Energy
Policy which, having been influenced by several EU energy and environmental
policies, was launched in 2012.235 The policy recognizes the major global energy
principles, including: Efficiency and Affordability; Security of Supply;
Diversification; Flexibility, and Sustainability. Six key policy areas were identified
to address these objectives, namely the need to: increase energy efficiency, reduce
reliance on imported fuels, ensure stability in energy supply, improve the country’s
carbon footprint, move towards efficient and effective delivery of energy, and
provide policy support to the energy sector.236
3. Laws and institutions relevant in the decarbonization efforts in Malta
In order to ensure an effective transition to a low carbon economy, laws and
regulations must be put in place. Indeed, these laws are present at the international,
regional and national levels. At the national or local level, the main law in the
Maltese energy sector is Act XXXIV, which came into force on the 14th of August
2014.237 This Energy Law covers and regulates different aspects of the energy sector,
including crude oil and petroleum products; electricity and electrical accessories;
kerosene control; natural gas distribution; and the use of biofuels.238. In an effort to
restructure and bring about competition in the energy sector, the Act brought about
various changes, including among others:
•
The transfer of all the assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of
Enemalta Corporation to Enemalta plc; the regulation of the functions of
the distribution system operators. This in effect necessitated the enactment
of the Enemalta (Transfer of Assets, Rights, Liabilities and Obligations)
Act.
•
Removal of a monopolised electrical energy market and
amendment of the Electricity Supply Regulations (S.L. 423.01).239
•
Act XXXIV also provided for the repeal of Chapter 272 of the laws
of Malta (the Enemalta Act) and made provision for any matter that is
ancillary to or connected thereto.240
233. MALTA ENERGY & RENEWABLE ENERGIES ASS’N, Energy Profile for Malta (2007).
234. Id. at 2.
235. Malta’s
National
Energy
Efficiency
Action
Plan,
5
(2012)
(Malta),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_neeap_en_malta.pdf [hereinafter NEEAP].
236. Id.
237. Enemalta (Transfer of Assets, Rights, Liabilities and Obligations) Act, 2014 (Act XXXIV of
2014) A 732 (Malta) [hereinafter Enemalta Act].
238. Id.
239. Id. (amendment to the Electricity Supply Regulations (S.L. 423.01) reflects the position that the
distribution system operator does not necessarily mean Enemalta. This is a key achievement with respect
to the introduction of competition in the electricity sector).
240. Id.
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Besides Act XXXIV of 2014, other principle laws regulating the energy sector of
Malta include the: The Petroleum (Production) Act (Chapter 156 of the laws of
Malta); The Petroleum (Production) Regulations (Subsidiary legislation 156.01);
Electricity Supply Regulations (S.L. 423.01); Enemalta (Transfer of Assets, Rights,
Liabilities and Obligations) Act; Electricity Market Regulations (S.L. 423.22). The
laws stipulate how other people or companies can be involved in the energy sector.
In this respect, Chapter 423 of the laws of Malta stipulate that no person is allowed
to carry out any activity or operation relating to energy, such as production and
distribution of electricity, without a permit.241
Governance systems are key in ensuring the effective implementation of the
various laws related to the transitioning to a low carbon economy. There are various
institutions relevant to the energy sector in Malta including: the Malta Resources
Authority (MRA);242 The Regulator for Energy and Water Services (REWS);243
Automated Revenue Management Services (ARMS);244 the Ministry for Energy and
Water Management; the Energy and Water Agency; and the Regulator for Energy
and Water Resources.
4. Electricity in Malta and Energy Competences
4.1. Electricity interconnections and distribution
The Island is fully electrified though up until April 2015, Malta’s electric
power system was isolated with a heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels.245 Reliance
on imported fuels undoubtedly has the effect of exposing Malta to volatile oil prices,
which impedes the ability to reliably predict electricity generation costs. 246 In this
respect, supported by the European Energy Program for Recovery, an electricity
interconnector, a high voltage subsea cable with 200 MW transmission capacity, was
commissioned between the two EU member states of Malta and Italy in early 2015.247
241. Malta Resources Authority Act, 2001 (Cap. 423) (Malta).
242. MALTA RESOURCES AUTHORITY [MRA] was established in 2000 and it is responsible for all
natural resources including energy, water and minerals. With respect to the energy sector, MRA is
responsible for the organization of the electricity industry and licensing of companies providing electricity
products.
243. REGULATOR FOR ENERGY & WATER SERV., https://www.rews.org.mt/#/en/home (last visited
Dec. 18, 2019) (Malta) [hereinafter REWS] (REWS was established on 31st July 2015 with the main
responsibility of regulating of the energy and water services in Malta. REWS was established by the House
of Representatives through the Regulator for Energy and Water Services Act (Act XXV) of 2015).
244. AUTOMATED REVENUE MGMT. SERV., ABOUT US, https://arms.com.mt/en/information/ourcompany/about-us (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (Malta) [hereinafter ARSM] (ARSM in collaboration with
Enemalta Corporation (EMC) and the Water Services Corporation (WSC) has been actively involved in
the implementation of Smart metering technology in Malta).
245. MALTA ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGIES ASS’N, supra note 233, at 1 (“The three
inhabited islands were interconnected by a single electricity grid, with electricity generation coming from
two fossil-fuelled power stations having a total combined nominal installed capacity of 571 MW.”).
246. Jan Ries et al., Interconnecting an Isolated Electricity System to the European Market: The Case
of Malta, 40 UTIL POL’Y 1, 1 (2016).
247. See id. at 1-4 (the Malta–Sicily interconnector is the submarine power cable, 95-kilometre (59 mi)
long, which connects the power grid of Malta with the Italian Transmission Network. It starts at Magħtab,
Qalet Marku in Malta and it runs to Marina di Ragusa in Sicily, Italy. It is managed by Terna, which is
part of the European grid).
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Although there are various advantages of interconnection such as and in the
case of Malta, an increase of electricity interconnection level from 0% to over
24%.248 Issues may arise whether the interconnection cable to Sicily threatens the
privileges of the incumbent utility Enemalta.249 Nevertheless, the country ought to
focus on the positive impact of the interconnection such as opening the Maltese
electricity grid to the rest of Europe. Scholars have also observed that, without
interconnecting isolated electric power systems (“EPS”), the islands (states) run the
risk of not being able to satisfy the demand in situations when external fuel import
is disrupted.250
Prima facie, it would, therefore, appear that the obvious positive impact of
interconnection would be the reduction of electricity prices for the consumers,
however, studies have shown that this is not necessarily the case as other factors are
essential including the installed generation capacity, oil price, and market design.251
Albeit, other developments such as the incorporation of natural gas in Malta’s energy
mix and electricity generation would also play a big role.252 Consequently, there have
been measures to increase gas-fired electricity generation in Malta. Thus in 2017, the
European Commission approved under EU state aid rules, the Maltese plans to pay
Electrogas Malta, for providing energy to the Maltese electricity company
Enemalta.253 Also, in place are plans to build the necessary infrastructure including
a gas pipeline interconnection between Delimara (Malta) and Gela (Italy)- this is
intended to connect Malta to the European Gas network.254 Moreover, there are
visible efforts to include renewable energy sources in the electricity generation in
Malta.255
With respect to electricity distribution, Enemalta is the main company
involved in this sector. Electricity is distributed from the Delimara Power Station
and the Maghtab Terminal Station of the Malta-Italy Interconnector to four 132 kV
distribution centers in Malta. This is done through 87 kilometres of underground 132
kV cables with a supply frequency of 50 Hz.256 Additionally, distribution is achieved

248. Malta Factsheet, supra note 218, at 5.
249. Ries et al., supra note 246, at 1, 9 (grid- interconnection also has the ability of ensuring electricity
trade thus lowering the cost of electricity to consumers by increasing use of the cheapest supply sources
in the connected markets and enable the least polluting generation sources to be utilised where it is
economic to do so).
250. Id. at 1.
251. Id. at 1, 9.
252. Id. at 9.
253. European Commission Press Release IP/17/43, State Aid: Commission Approves Support for
Delimara Gas and Power Energy Project in Malta (Jan. 11, 2017).
254. European
Commission,
Electricity
Interconnection
Malta-Italy,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/electricity-interconnectors/mt-it_en.pdf.
255. See
ENEMALTA,
Grid-connected
Renewable
Energy
Systems,
https://www.enemalta.com.mt/services/grid-connected-renewable-energy-systems/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2019) (With respect to electricity from renewable energy, Enemalta as the network operator provides its
customers with the necessary metering and connection equipment to use in their renewable energy
generators (such as wind turbines or photovoltaic panels), to feed electricity to the grid.).
256. See id. (At these centres, voltage is stepped down to 33 kV so that electricity can be channelled
to another 20 33 kV distribution centres. This part of the network includes 260 kilometres of 33 kV
underground cables and 13 kilometres of 33 kV subsea cables. Each 33 kV distribution centre feeds a
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through a four-level network, comprising four different voltage levels, 132 kV, 33
kV, 11 kV, and 400/230 V.257
4.2. Political decentralization and energy competences
The electricity sector in most EU member states have been characterized by
reforms which had the effect of transitioning from state driven monopolies to
liberalized marketplaces. Although all EU countries are bound to abide by the
competition laws, Malta benefits from the derogations in directive 2009/72/EC
because under EU legislation, Malta is considered as a small, isolated system.258
This, therefore, implies that Malta does not have to comply with the distribution
system operator (“DSO”) unbundling (Article 26), third-party access (Article 32),
and market opening (Article 33).259 Albeit, these exemptions maybe affected by the
Whereas the establishment of electricity wholesale markets is a common feature in
liberalizing the energy sector in the EU and, as such, these markets provide for
different ways of selling generated electricity the day-ahead market (“DAM”):260 In
Malta, however, such a trading platform was not in existence as electricity generation
and its remuneration were centralized.261 The government has for a long time heavily
subsidized Enemalta to ensure that it provides affordable electricity prices.262
Enemalta PLC is a vertically integrated company, which is the designated
distribution operator and remains the main producer of electricity in Malta.263
Dispatching and balancing are also carried out by Enemalta PLC.264
Taking stock of the above, therefore, we note that, unlike other EU
countries, liberalization is limited in Malta. However, competition in the Malta
energy sector was brought about by Act XXXIV of 2014.265 The Act opened
competition in the distribution of energy and this is covered under Part Two of the
Act which highlights the regulation of the distribution system operators in relation
to matters such as the duties of a distribution system operator in relation to the supply
of electrical energy; the limitation of liability and the prices to be charged.266 The
restructuring was intended to introduce competition and attract foreign investment.
The major changes were made following the large investments made by a
Chinese company Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited. Following the
investment, Enemalta p.l.c. was partly privatized through the acquisition of a
number of 11 kV circuits, mostly in radial configuration, supplying over 1,400 11 kV substations
(secondary substations)).
257. ENEMALTA, About Us, https://www.enemalta.com.mt/about-us/our-network/ (last visited Dec.
20, 2019).
258. MALTA RESOURCES AUTHORITY, Malta’s Report to the European Commission on the
Implementation of Directive 2009/72/EC, Directive 2009/73/EC and Directive 2005/58/EC, (2013),
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/NATIONAL_REPORTS/N
ational% 20Reporting%202013/NR_En/C13_NR_Malta-EN.pdf [hereinafter MRA].
259. Id.
260. DAM is a situation where electricity is traded one day prior to physical delivery.
261. Ries et al., supra note 246.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Enemalta Act, supra note 237.
266. Id.
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minority shareholding by Shanghai Electric Power.267 The transaction abolished a
fully monopolized energy market in Malta and ensured that private companies can
collaborate with Enemalta in the renewable energy and energy servicing fields.
Despite these positive developments, given the small size of Malta, which implies a
small electricity market, the country has been granted large derogations from the
requirements of the Electricity Directive on unbundling of distribution system
operators. 268 In this respect, Enemalta PLC is the designated distribution operator
and remains the main producer of electricity in Malta.269
5. Renewable Energy Generation
As illustrated in the previous sections, there is a heavy reliance on fossil
fuels in Malta and, as such, diversification of the energy sector is one of the main
objectives of the Maltese government.270 There have been some achievements in the
diversification efforts as evidenced by an increase of renewables in electricity
generation from nearly 0 to 4% in the period 2010- 2015.271 Moreover, Malta was
able to meet its 2013/2014 indicative trajectory on RES share in gross final energy
consumption and is on track to reach its 10% renewable energy target for 2020.
272
Although the country is on target to meet its 10% RES share by 2020, in 2016,
Malta’s share of renewable energy was 6.0%, below the EU average of 17%, despite
having seen an improvement when compared to previous years. 273
Nevertheless, RES will continue to play an important role in Malta’s energy
mix. In fact, electricity generation from small and large-scale photovoltaic (“PV”)
installations is expected to continue to increase steadily, reaching approximately 185
Mwp generating circa 278 Gwh in 2020; almost 11.5% of the gross final electricity
consumption.274
There are several incentives for the promotion of RES electricity generation
and, as such, electricity from renewable energy sources is promoted through a
combination of feed-in tariffs and investment grants.275 In the transport sector for
instance, RES are encouraged by a substitution obligation on importers of fossil
fuels, and this in effect made it possible for Malta to avoid about 5.2% of the fossil
fuel in gross inland consumption and about 4.0% of GHG emissions at national level
in 2015, compared to the EU average of respectively 10.1% and 9.1% reduction.
Besides the various incentives, RES especially solar is favored by the good weather

267. Enemalta was established in 1977 and it is the leading energy services provider in the Maltese
Islands, entrusted with the generation and distribution of electricity, and the development of the national
electricity distribution network.
268. Ries et al., supra note 246.
269. ENEMALTA, About Us, https://www.enemalta.com.mt/about-us/our-network/ (last visited Dec.
20, 2019).
270. Ries et al., supra note 246.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. ENEMALTA, About Us, https://www.enemalta.com.mt/about-us/our-network/ (Dec. 20, 2019).
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conditions in Malta.276 There is also a potential for wind energy, although this is
constrained by the limited availability of land and deep coastal waters around the
Republic of Malta.277
In an effort to fully diversify the energy sector, in May 2017, Malta
published its revised National Renewable Energy Action Plan (“NREAP”),
incorporating new priorities, projects, and initiatives put forward for the energy
sector.278 The country also has in place a draft Renewable Energy Policy, which
focuses on the development of various renewable energy sources including
photovoltaic, wind energy conversion systems and energy production from waste.279
Additionally, diversification is emphasized in the Maltese Energy and Climate Plan,
which covers the 2021-2030 period.280 The key issues to consider to achieve the
objectives of the Plan include:
•
Diversifying Malta’s dependence on the importation of oil through
the achievement of a diversified energy mix.
•
Reducing the carbon footprint and greenhouse gas emissions of the
country through improved efficiency in generation capacity
•
Replacement of heavy fuel oil with natural gas and gas oil, and
renewable sources
•
Enhancing and strengthening the security of supply of the country
whilst ensuring the availability of appropriate backup capacity.
•
Stimulating investment in renewable energy sources through the
provision of appropriate incentives.
•
Achieving a degree of interconnection for electricity supply, and
overhauling the generation capacity of the country with a view to achieving higher
efficiency gains whilst stimulating investment in natural gas infrastructures.
As discussed above, there is indeed potential for increased penetration of RES in
Malta however massive investments are needed to diversify the energy mix.281
6. Smart Grid & Smart Metering systems
With respect to smart grids, Malta contracted IBM to install a 70 million
pounds smart utility grid and also replace 250,000 analogue electricity and water
meters with smart meters by 2012.282 On the other hand, smart meters for energy and
water saw their way into Malta in the year of 2009 when IBM a computing giant, in

276. Being in the center of the Mediterranean, Malta experiences adequate sunlight for around 80%
of the year. Indeed, the country has the highest level of solar irradiation in the EU.
277. MRA, http://www.mra.org.mt; EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY’S [EEA] Eionet/Central Data
Repository.
278. See ENERGY & WATER AGENCY, National Renewable Energy Action Plan 2015-2020, (Malta)
https://meae.gov.mt/en/public_consultations/opm/documents/pr%20162438a.pdf.
279. Id.
280. Malta’s 2030 Draft National Energy and Climate Plan, (2018) (Malta),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/malta_draftnecp.pdf.
281. See generally Yesbol Gabdullin & Brian Azzopardi 2018 IEEE 7th World Conference on
Photovoltaic Energy Conversion (WCPEC), Impacts of High Penetration of Photovoltaic Integration in
Malta, 1398-1401 (June 2018).
282. See Press Release, IBM, IBM to Implement 70 Million Euro Smart Grid System for Malta, (Feb.
4, 2009), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/26596.wss.
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collaboration with Enemalta started a $89.9 million five-year project to design and
deliver smart electric and water meters to the people of Malta thus replacing the
250,000 analog electric meters.283 As in other parts of the world, the purpose of smart
meters was, among others, to ensure that consumers monitor electricity usage close
to real time and also to identify water leaks and electricity losses. 284
By the end of 2014, Enemalta had installed 270,000 smart meters, although
the project faced some setbacks in some areas that were closed premises and as such
presented technical difficulties for installation.285 Additionally, there were some
challenges relating to electricity theft and this was as a result of system tampering,
where over 1000 smart meters system were tampered with thus recording fewer
energy units than what was actually consumed.286 Tampering attempts were,
however, short-lived and were tackled by equipping the meters with sensors and
alarms.287 Indeed, there is a need to ensure the vigilance of all the concerned market
players.288 The main market players in the smart grid and smart meters include:
Enemalta Plc; Water Services Corporation; Automated Revenue Management
Services ltd; Malta Resources Authority; Ministry for Energy and Health;
Sustainable Energy and Water Conservation Unit.
7. Electric Vehicles and Storage
Decarbonization efforts in Malta are also evidenced in the transport sector
by the introduction of electric vehicles. Generally speaking, Malta’s final energyconsumption in the transport sector increased by 5.3% from 2005 to 2015 and as
such the transport sector in 2015 was by far the largest energy consuming sector
representing a 54.4% share in the total final energy consumption, which is well above
the EU average (i.e. 33.1%).289 In fact, emissions of greenhouse gases from traffic
have been increasing in Malta with a 95.7% CO2 emissions from road transport in
2015 above the 1990 levels.290 In an effort to reduce the emissions, the National
Transport Strategy (“Strategy”) was adopted in 2016 with a 2050 horizon and an
Operational Transport Master Plan to 2025.291 The Strategy includes measures such
as the rationalization of the use of private cars.292
Following the establishment of the Malta National Electromobility
Platform, electric vehicles have been embraced in Malta as one of the ways of
283. Id.
284. Rafael Leal-Arcas et al., Decarbonizing the Energy Sector, 15 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L.
173 (2019).
285. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION WORLD, Malta Discovers Electricity Theft from Altered Smart
Meters, (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.tdworld.com/node/30142.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Malta Factsheet, supra note 218, at 8.
290. Id. at 11.
291. David Sutton, Malta’s National Transport Strategy, 2050 and Transport Master Plan, 2025,
TRANSPORT MALTA (2018) 2, https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/malta-national-transportstrategy-2050-transport-master-plan-2025.pdf?_ga=2.214567383.1581743126.1561381709997545196.1560867839.
292. Id.
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reducing emissions in the transport sector.293 The future of electromobility in Malta
is highlighted in the National Electromobility Action Plan, which foresees the
implementation of concrete projects, programs, and measures by which Malta will
contribute to its international environmental obligations.294 One such obligation is
that Malta is committed to put 5,000 Battery Electric Vehicles on the road by 2020.295
The political backing and incentives have spurred the deployment of electric vehicles
in recent years from 36 in 2013 to a total of 976 units (including all type of Hybrid,
plug/in hybrid and range extender Electric Vehicles) by end May 2017.296
Additionally, there have been developments in the charging infrastructure with, “102
charging points being made available to the general public” and there are ambitious
plans by the Government to deploy a further 400 charging points on Maltese roads
by 2020.297
“In a recent study about the penetration of EVs in EU member states,
scholars highlighted the low penetration of these vehicles despite various efforts in
the region.”298 It was also noted that the most important policy instruments to
promote EVs are tax and infrastructure measures in addition to financial
incentives.299 In this respect, the Maltese Government has committed to abolish
entirely the registration tax on electric cars. Additionally, the government has put in
place both car registration tax rates and car ownership tax rates which depend on
CO2 emission performance.300
Besides the political backing, there have also been incentives to make
electric vehicles more acceptable in Malta. For instance, there are various transport
initiatives aimed at promoting plug-in and electric vehicles, including the recent
grant of a total of €2.5 million, which has been allocated to help drivers purchase
cleaner modes of transport, such as hybrid plug-in and electric vehicles.301 This is
known as a scrappage scheme, where motorists who wish to scrap their old car in
exchange for an electric car can have access to the grant. 302 There have also been
efforts by the Government to install a National Electric Car Charging Network which
will provide Battery Electric Vehicle users the possibility to charge their car using
publicly accessible car charging points in specific and prominent parking spaces
across Malta and Gozo which will be connected together through a network.303

293. MALTA NATIONAL ELECTROMOBILITY PLATFORM, Introduction, GOV’T OF
MALTA, https://electromobilitycms.gov.mt/en/Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Cansino et al., supra note 171, at 1-2, 19.
299. Id.
300. Malta Factsheet, supra note 218, at 8.
301. Massimo Costa, [WATCH] If You’re Buying an Electric Car, These Grants will Make it Cheaper,
MALTA TODAY, (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/92570/watch_if_youre_
buying_an_electric_car_these_grants_will_make_it_cheaper#.XfyZ_pNKjOR.
302. See id.
303. ELECTROMOBILITY
MALTA,
Electromobility,
(MALTA),
https://mtip.gov.mt/en/Pages/Electromobility/Electromobility.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
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Additionally, the annual road license fee is set at a standard 10 Euros for all electric
vehicles, no matter how old and powerful the vehicle is.304
Despite all the various incentives, the penetration of EVs is still low in
Malta. This is the case in most countries around the globe and it has been attributed
to several different factors that dissuade potential buyers. Scholars have grouped
these factors into internal, external and applied factors.305 In the first group, there is
a higher initial investment, an extended recharging time, and a limited range. 306 The
latter group includes financial and non-financial incentives, public support for the
construction of recharging infrastructure, and awareness-raising.307
Additionally, some scholars have argued that one of the most important
factors in the decision to purchase an EV is the availability of charging stations
coupled with public visibility/social norms.308 With respect to infrastructural
development, Malta has seen an increase in charging points from 26 in 2014 to 36 in
2016 and there are ambitious plans to increase the number of public charging points
up to 500 by the year 2020.309 The island has indeed put massive efforts in EV
infrastructural development and as such three solar charging stations have been
installed at Ta’ Xbiex Marina, Ċirkewwa and Marsa (Deep Water Quay) car parks.310
Moreover, a network of medium-fast charging points has also been installed all over
the island with the capability of charging an electric car battery from 0% to 100% in
3-4 hours.311
8. Data Protection
With the introduction of smart technology in the energy sector, it becomes
essential to ensure that the privacy of energy consumers be respected and this
definitely necessitates data protection. As a member state of the European Union,
Malta’s data protection laws include the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
(2016/679) (“GDPR”). Chapter 586 of the Laws of Malta, the Data Protection Act
(2018), along with its subsidiary legislation, came into force on 28 May 2018,
repealing the previous Data Protection Act of 2001.312
Malta is also a party to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals
regarding the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS.108), which came into
force in 2003.313 With respect to the relevant institutions, the office of the

304. TRANSPORT
MALTA,
Advantages
of
Owning
an
Electric
Vehicle
2,
https://electromobilitycms.gov.mt/en/Documents/EV%20Leaflet%20TM.pdf.
305. See Makena Coffman et al., Electric Vehicles Revisited: A Review of Factors That Affect
Adoption, 37 TRANSPORT REVS. 79, 80 (2017).
306. Cansino et al., supra note 171, at 2.
307. Coffman et al., supra note 305, at 86.
308. William Sierzchula et al., The Influence of Financial Incentives and Other Socio-Economic
Factors on Electric Vehicle Adoption, 68 ENERGY POL’Y 183 (2014).
309. TRANSPORT MALTA, supra note 307 at 2.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See Data Protection Act, 2002, Cap. 440 (Malta), repealed by Data Protection Act, Cap. 586
(Malta), see art. 34.
313. Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108.
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Information and Data Protection Commissioner, appointed according to article 11 of
the Data Protection Act (2018), is the supervisory authority responsible for
overseeing the applicability and enforcement of data protection law in accordance
with the requirements of the GDPR.314 The GDPR has been implemented through
the Maltese Data Protection Act 2018 (Chapter 586 of the Laws of Malta) (“DPA”)
which took effect on 28 May 2018.315 The DPA establishes the Information and Data
Protection Commissioner as the supervisory authority in Malta.316
With respect to smart grids and smart meters, the collection of personal data
must comply with the rules outlines in the GDPR and as such personal data must be:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specific, explicit and legitimate
purposes and in this respect for smart grid purposes; (c) adequate, relevant and not
excessive; (d) accurate and, where necessary, up to date; (e) kept in an identifiable
form for no longer than necessary; and (f) kept secure.317 It is also essential that the
data subject gives his/her consent before data processing is carried out. The GDPR
provisions relating to the appointment of a data protection officer also apply to Malta
as the country has not implemented any laws derogating from this requirement. 318
We note however that, there are instances when a data protection officer
should be appointed including if the controller and processors: (i) are a public
authority; (ii) their core activities consist of regular and systematic monitoring of
data subjects on a large scale; or (iii) their core activities consist of processing
sensitive personal data on a large scale (including processing information about
criminal offenses).319 The data protection officer must be involved in all data
protection issues and cannot be dismissed or penalized for performing their role.320
The data protection officer must report directly to the highest level of
management.321 In Malta, the Information and Data Protection Commissioner assists
controllers with compliance with the DPA by enhancing their internal structures
through suggesting the appointment of Data Protection Officers and continuous
dialogue.322
Smart meter and grid customers are also entitled to privacy notices.323
Under the GDPR, the controller must provide data subjects with a privacy notice
setting out how the individual’s personal data will be processed.324 In Malta, since
Maltese and English are both official languages, providing the information in either
of the two languages would be acceptable. In the event that the wrong information is
collected by the smart meter companies, the data subject is entitled to have the
inaccurate data corrected.325
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Data Protection Act, Cap. 586 (Malta), at art. 11.
Id. at art. 2.
Id. at art. 11(2).
See generally id. at art. 7-8.
See generally id. at art. 6.
See generally GDPR, at art 37.
See generally id. at 38.
See id. at art 39.
See id. at art. 37.
See generally id. at 30.
See Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 199, 1, 31 n. 2.
See id. at ? GDPR.
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Smart grid and smart meter companies are also obliged to take security
measures to ensure the protection of personal data.326 In this respect, as controllers
and processors, they must ensure, where appropriate: (i) the pseudonymisation and
encryption of personal data; (ii) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality,
integrity, availability and resilience of its information technology systems; (iii) the
ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in
the event of a physical or technical incident; and (iv) a process for regularly testing,
assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organizational measures
for ensuring the security of the processing.327 Also, they must ensure that security
rules are observed by third party agents (processors).328
Enforcement of data protection rules is key and, in this regard, a form of
penalty for non-compliance is introduced under the GDPR. Accordingly, it
introduces an antitrust-type sanction regime with fines of up to 4% of annual
worldwide turnover or €20m, for higher tier breaches and up to 2% of annual
worldwide turnover or €10m, whichever is the greater-for lower tier breaches.329 In
Malta, there are also measures to ensure that data protection provisions are respected,
in this respect, DPA stipulates that any person who: (i) knowingly provides false
information to the Information and Data Protection Commissioner in response to an
exercise of his investigative powers; or (ii) does not comply with any lawful request
pursuant to an investigation by the Commissioner, shall be guilty of an offence and
upon conviction, shall be liable to a fine of not less than €1250 and not more than
€50,000 euros and/or to a term of imprisonment of six months.330 Additionally, the
law also makes provision for compensation and, as such, data subjects have a right
to compensation in respect of material and non-material damage.331
Although not related to the enforcement of GDPR, Malta has a track-record
of enforcing the previous data protection law and in this respect, in the year 2017,
Information and Data Protection Commissioner appealed three Data Protection
Tribunal decisions to the Court of Appeal.332 Additionally, the Information and Data
Protection Commissioner received 71 complaints and 10 personal data breaches
notifications.333 Several administrative fines were imposed including: €500 for
unsolicited communications; €500 for incorrect processing of personal; €2,000 for
failure to implement appropriate technical and operational measures; €1,000 for
incorrect processing of personal data; €2,000 for accidental loss of personal
data.334Moreover, during the period of January 2018 to June 2018, 32 complaints and

326. GDPR art. 3.
327. See Data Protection Act, supra note 314, at art. 6.
328. Id.
329. Lower tier breaches include among others the failure to notify a personal data breach; higher tier
breaches on the other hand include among others failure to comply with the six general data quality
principles or carrying out processing without satisfying a condition for processing personal data.
330. See Data Protection Act, supra note 314, at art. 22.
331. See id. at art. 30(2-3).
332. Dr. Paul Gonzi, Data Protection & GDPR Legal Update, (October 8, 2018),
https://fenechlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Retention-Periods-Maltapost-Court-of-Appeal.pdf,
(Some of the recent cases can be accessed at Fenech & Fenech Advocates).
333. Id.
334. Id.
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20 data breaches were notified to the Information and Data Protection
Commissioner.335
9. Demand Response and Energy Efficiency
9.1 Energy Efficiency
Electricity demand has been on the increase in Malta and, as such, on July
2019, Enemalta plc recorded the highest ever demand for electricity supply, which
reached 510MW, as compared to the 488MW in August 2017.336 This increase in
demand has been associated with high temperatures during the same period.337 This
increase in electricity demand definitely brings into play issues to do with energy
efficiency, which generally aims at ensuring the use of less energy to provide the
same service; and demand response, which is concerned with changes in electric
usage by end-use customers.338
Taking stock of the above, therefore, Malta’s targets with respect to energy
efficiency are contained in the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan
(“NEEAP”).339 NEEAP, in line with Directive 2012/27/EU, was presented by the
Agency to the European Commission in April 2017.340 It takes note of the various
actions taken at the national level and reviews the indicative 2020 national target
notified to the EU Commission, and the actions necessary to achieve the obligatory
cumulative end-use energy savings target.341 The NEEAP 2017 adjusted Malta’s
indicative target for 2020 as 822,903 toe in primary energy consumption. 342The Plan
also projects a final energy consumption of 633,875 toe in 2020.343
In the past, Malta has been on record for achieving its energy efficiency
targets. In this respect, the country achieved the target of 3% energy end-use savings
for 2010 (established in the first NEEAP)-the target was 126GWh and the
achievement was 153GWh.344 Various Various changes in different sectors have
made it possible to improve energy efficiency including in the transport sector,
domestic sector and industrial sector. Some of the positive changes in the transport
sector include not only the introduction of electric cars but also changes in the
national car fleet composition brought about by changes in the vehicle registration

335. Additionally, five administrative fines were imposed for unauthorized disclosure to third parties
in the following amounts: €2,500, €500, €1,500, €1,000 and €1,000.
336. ENEMALTA, Enemalta Registered the Highest Electricity Demand, (July 10, 2019),
https://www.enemalta.com.mt/news/high-electricity-demand-registered/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
337. Id.
338. Rafael Leal-Arcas et al., Decarbonizing the Energy Sector, 15 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L.
173 (2019).
339. OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, National Energy Efficiency Action Plan ENERGY & PROJECTS
(2017) (Malta) [hereinafter NEEAP].
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Ing. Charles Buttigieg, Energy Efficiency Policies in Malta, (2017) THE ENERGY & WATER
AGENCY,
https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/events/workshops/malta/3-Energy-Efficiciency-PoliciesMalta.pdf.
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system. Changes in the domestic sector include schemes to replace appliances,
change lighting systems and install solar water heaters.345
Additionally, other measures to increase energy efficiency as highlighted in
the 2017 NEEAP have already been discussed in the previous sections, including:
smart meters; renewable energy deployment; upgrading of the national electricity
distribution network; electricity tariffs designed to promote energy efficiency among
consumers; financing schemes or instruments and fiscal incentives; training and
education including energy advisory programs.346 Consequently, these incentives
and efforts to promote energy efficiency in Malta resulted in a decrease of primary
energy intensity in Malta from 2005-2015 at a faster pace than for the EU as a whole,
and it is now lower than EU average.347 Albeit there was an increase in the final
energy consumption (3%) in 2015 which is the largest among EU Member States.348
Nevertheless, the recent growth in GDP and increase in population which
were 1.2% and 7.4% respectively have led to an increase in energy consumption.349
The strong correlation between energy consumption and GDP cannot be ignored as
evidenced in Malta where final energy consumption rose by 5.1% whereas GDP at
constant prices increased by 7.4%.350
9.2 Demand Response
With a heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels, Malta’s main focus in the
energy sector is not only to diversification but also to ensure the security of supply.
As stated earlier, the electricity interconnection between Malta and Italy ended the
Island’s electricity isolation as it enabled Malta to exchange electricity with the
Italian power market thus achieving a diversified mix of energy resources.351
The Maltese electricity sector has been undergoing various infrastructural
and operational changes and, as such, the technical capabilities and opportunities for
Demand Response participation in the retail market are not yet clear to warrant a
definition of technical modalities for participation.352 The tariff system is essential in
influencing demand response, unlike other EU countries, Malta has a “Single Buyer
Model” market and, as such, the production and distribution costs for the supply of
electricity are covered by a single unbundled Tariff.353 We also note that there no
345. Id.
346. Energy Efficiency Directive Implementation in Malta, Concerted Action Energy Efficiency
Directive, 2014.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Buttigieg, supra note 344.
351. Enemata Corporation is the only DSO as the country has no transmission systems and no
transmission system operators.
352. Bertoldi et al., supra note 77, at 109.
353. Id. (Additionally, the electricity market in Malta is constituted by a relatively high proportion of
low consumption customers and a small portion of high consumption customers. Thereby dynamic pricing
as a means of Demand Response will have to be distributed over a wide base of consumers to produce
any meaningful contribution that might benefit both supplier and customers. Due to limited competition
in the electricity sector, dynamic pricing for Demand Response measures offered by networks or retail
tariffs such as time-of-use tariffs, critical peak pricing, real time pricing and peak time rebates are still
absent in the Maltese electricity market.).
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specific measures in the residential sector which are aimed at demand response,
although the tariff system for the residential is based on a Progressive Tariff Model
with a social component at the base, progressively increasing to emulate a Polluter
Pays Principle.354
Additionally, there is an Eco-reduction bonus for consumers whose
consumption is below average.355 It is worth noting that Malta has no capacity market
and no aggregators.356 Demand Response in Malta is, therefore, constrained by the
small electricity market and lack of adequate competition. Nevertheless, it is likely
the milestone in smart meters will encourage consumers to consume electricity more
efficiently.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike most EU member states, Malta being a small island faces unique
challenges and opportunities in decarbonizing its energy sector. As discussed in the
previous sections, the size and geography of the island present opportunities for
renewable energy deployment and, at the same time, it is a constraint to competition
in the electricity sector due to the small electricity market. This has not only made it
impossible to embrace demand response programs but also constrained
diversification. That said, the electricity interconnector between Malta and Italy has
opened the island to the European market. Moreover, the country has also embraced
reforms aimed at diversifying the energy sector, including the deployment of
renewable energy sources, electric vehicles, smart meters and smart grids, all of
which are aimed at tackling climate change challenges.
As for Romania, it is particularly interesting given that, on the one hand, it
enjoys relative energy independence and security vis-à-vis its EU peers, but also
other neighbouring countries, while, on the other, it remains one of the most energyintensive and polluting EU Member States. At the same time, Romania’s
performance in relation to increasing the share of RES in energy consumption and
electricity production places it among the leaders at the regional and EU levels,
particularly in terms of wind-generated power.
What is more, while deep reforms have taken place within the context of its
transitioning from a bureaucratic command economy towards a market-based
economy, infrastructural and other conditions have hampered Romania’s
performance in relation to ‘smartening’ its electricity grid. While a considerable part
of the electricity sector is privatized and retail prices have been deregulated, thus
leading to greater market liquidity at the cross-border level – a condition that could
facilitate regional price convergence and, more generally, energy efficiency –
electricity infrastructure remains basic and aging, with Romania lagging behind
when it comes to self-generation, EV proliferation, storage, and DR development.

354. Id. (For large non–residential consumers there are a Night Tariff and a Maximum Demand
Charge, two measures which promote Demand Side Management helping to limit the infrastructural
investments and operational cost on the network.).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 110 (The role of aggregators basically depend upon the participation of consumers in
Demand Response programs and since the market for Demand Response is not yet set up in Malta then
the aggregators also don’t exist.).
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While cross-border infrastructural projects aimed at increasing the interconnectivity
of the broader region are currently underway, for the most part, they concern the
infrastructure at junction points than at the national level. In that sense, there is a
disparity between the level of attention and funding that the domestic aspects of the
national grid system receive vis-à-vis its cross-border interconnective aspects.
Consequently, basic and ageing infrastructural factors cause the kind of bottlenecks
for other developments concerning electricity system smartening efforts. However,
there is also policy – other than infrastructural – issues that hamper smartening
efforts. As discussed earlier, self-generation is rather low, and adjustments to RES
support schemes have had implications for self-generation proliferation, but also
investor confidence; however, recent re-tweaking (cf. prosumer support measures
further to recent legislation, discussed earlier) may rebalance this situation.
Smart metering, for its part, remains limited, however, there are official
plans for this to be universalised by 2029. While this is not ideal, given the
implications this has for, among other things, the attainment of demand
responsiveness objectives, this slow progress could be offset by Romania’s
remarkable performance in terms of RES share of energy consumption and electricity
generation, but also excused to some extent by the other, perhaps, more pressing
social and economic exigencies at play (discussed passim).
In terms of zero- and low-emissions mobility, again, infrastructural issues
– namely, the puny amount of charging points – undermine EV proliferation and
transport decarbonization objectives.
Concerning storage, this remains considerably underdeveloped while
demand responsiveness exists merely as a matter that is legally possible and largely
in abstract. That said, retail price deregulation and regulatory encouragement of
suppliers and other market operators to provide dynamic pricing to consumers, are
important policy and market tools that lay the foundations for greater demand
responsiveness, and, potentially, more efficient electricity use by and greater savings
to consumers.
Lastly, while increased RES shares in energy consumption and electricity
generation, along with further fossil fuel discoveries, bolster Romania’s continued
energy security, other issues – including inflation, energy poverty, child poverty,
skilled labour shortages, and a dwindling population –357 remain unresolved and may
thus quite justifiably take public policy and budgetary precedence when compared
to smart grid-related efforts.
The ever-increasing RES share in electricity generation necessitates greater
interconnectivity and the development of storage capacity. Higher degrees of
357. Cf. Irina Marica, Romania’s Population Keeps Shrinking in 2017 Due to Demographic Decline
and Migration, ROMANIA INSIDER, (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.romania-insider.com/romaniapopulation-down-2017-demographic-decline; Irene Costelian, La Roumanie perd ses têtes, LIBÉRATION,
(Jan. 19 2018), https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/01/19/la-roumanie-perd-ses-tetes_1623807
(Romanian Brain Drain) (Fr.); see also cf. U.N.., World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key
Findings and Advance Tables, 13, 20, (DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION, Working Paper
No.
ESA/P/WP/248,
2017),
https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf, (according to which, by
2050 Romania’s population is likely to decrease by at least 15% in relation to 2017 levels (at p. 13, and
that currently 25% of the population is older than 59, while 49% is between the ages of 25 and 59, at p.
20.).
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interconnectivity may well lead to greater price convergence, which often involves
favourable outcomes for consumers. It may also lead to efficiencies by reducing loss
or redundancy that may arise with greater shares of variable electricity generation
(i.e., via RES). Greater interconnectivity relies not only on infrastructure but also on
factors such as cross-border marketization/liquidity of electricity to facilitate
wholesale trade between systems as a means of preventing electricity redundancy.
This is where other technical factors – such as market structures – come into
play that, in turn, rely on non-technical factors, including national and regional
policy. While Romania pursues regional integration of cross-border wholesale
electricity trade and is involved in cross-border infrastructural projects that are set to
benefit national, regional, and EU interconnectivity objectives, the government may
want to look at other sections of the electricity wholesale market, than currently
traded, that may be amenable to greater cross-border coordination and liquidity as a
means of achieving greater cross-border price convergence and energy efficiency in
the interests of market actors and ultimate consumers (industry and households)
alike.
While the Romanian government is involved in projects to increase the
infrastructural interconnectivity of Romania’s electricity system with that of the
region as a means of addressing national and regional energy efficiency and security
goals, perhaps more could be done on the part of the EU to prioritize infrastructural
spending aimed at its Energy Union358 and Energy Community objectives as a means
of helping Romania reach parity with more interconnected and better performing
parts of the broader EU and Energy Community electricity networks. While Romania
is a large beneficiary of EU solidarity,359 it may be that more could justifiably be
done on the part of the EU within the context of existing EU schemes to modernize
Romania’s electricity system (but to also assist with the other social issues alluded
to earlier). For instance, classifying certain projects as being of common interest
and/or strategic to the EU could attract the necessary funding under existing
schemes. In that respect, there seems to be more that the EU – than the Romanian
government – could do to address interconnectivity and other smart grid-related
issues.
In terms of the promotion of low- to zero-emissions mobility (“EVs”), the
government ought to consider substantially increasing the number of charging
points, along with a range of financial and non-financial incentives – other than the
current purchase subsidies, registration tax and fees waiver for EVs, and emissionsbased road tax reductions – to encourage greater take-up. Particularly support for
installing charging capacity near homes and within residential areas, given that
358. Cf.
EUROSTAT,
What
is
the
Energy
Union
About?,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-1.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2019);
Commission, Priorities, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en (EC)
(last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (The Energy Union is a 2015 EU strategy concerning the bloc’s energy
interests, including those pertaining to climate change mitigation and economic resilience. The goal is to
for EU consumers – households and industry alike – to have access to ‘secure, sustainable, competitive
and affordable energy’. This goal is predicated on five interrelated aspects, namely, energy security,
solidarity, and trust; a fully integrated internal market; energy efficiency contributing to moderation of
energy demand; the decarbonization of the economy; and research, innovation, and competitiveness.).
359. Cf. SWD (2019) 1022 final, supra note 26, at 17 (Up to EUR 30.8 billion was allocated to
Romania for the 2014-2020 period.).
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home-charging feasibility seems to be a key driver in EV purchase decisions. What
is more, information programs aimed at raising public awareness as to
decarbonization but also EV subsidies have a role to play.
While the cost of increasing the total number of charging points may be
unjustified vis-à-vis the current size of the domestic EV fleet, considering how the
number of charging points is among the main factors behind EV purchase decisions,
and mindful of its decarbonization and other related objectives, the government
should earnestly pursue this. There are examples from other EU peers where publiccharging infrastructure was deployed without burdening the public purse through
partnerships with private operators.360 The government could consider extending its
subsidies programme to facilitate home and workplace charging, as this appears to
be a key practical issue that drives EV purchase decisions. Other than ensuring that
there are sufficient charging points, the most successful EU members in terms of
greater EV penetration – namely, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK –
have adopted a variety of policies including income and/or corporate tax reductions
or credits, R&D project funding, and the distribution of EVs to public and private
entities.361
Moreover, the government could take note of a recent simulation study of a
model concerning a self-powered (via solar means) EV charging station which
indicated that, although the cost of the electricity generated through it would be
35.3% higher than that of conventionally generated electricity, attendant benefits
included substantial reductions in emissions, excess power generated that could be
fed into the electricity system, and a much smarter grid better equipped to address
issues that arise with greater EV proliferation – namely, the implications of the latter
for grid capacity and storage.362
In terms of RES electricity generation, while Romania’s performance in
increasing the RES share in energy consumption and electricity generation is
commendable, there seem to be technical, market, and regulatory factors – such as
those mentioned in earlier parts of this article – to explain Romania’s failure to be
included within the top 40 countries in the latest Renewable Energy Country
Attractiveness Index (“RECAI”),363 and this may have implications for much needed
360. Cf. TRANSPORT & ENVIRONMENT, Roll-out of Public EV Charging Infrastructure in the EU: Is
the Chicken and Egg Dilemma Resolved? 13 (2001) (Note the example of Flanders, Belgium, where 2,500
public charging stations are to be installed by Allego at their expense by 2020.).
361. Cf. Cansino et al., supra note 171, at 9-18.
362. Cf. Gheorghe Badea et al., Design and Simulation of Romanian Solar Energy Charging Station
for Electric Vehicles, 1 ENERGIES, 12-13 (2019) (In sum, a total surface area of just 45.65 m 2 could reliably
generate a total of 5,789 kWh/year solely from solar irradiance, of which 55.47% was expected to be used
for EV charging purposes, while any excess, save for losses, could be fed into the electricity system. The
total cost of the station stood at c. EUR 24,692. CO2 emissions vis-à-vis conventionally produced
electricity were c. 67% lower, and these seem to largely be inherent to the equipment and their
manufacturing process, than a by-product of generation. While the cost per unit of electricity generated
was 35.3% higher than that conventionally generated nationally (viz., 0.17/kWh v. 0.11/kWh) this was
11.76% higher than the average cost at EU level, and the attendant benefits, when also taken into account,
could more than justify the adoption and roll-out of that model.).
363. Ben Warren, Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index (RECAI), ERNST & YOUNG, (Nov.
4, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_uk/power-utilities/renewable-energy-country-attractiveness-index
(Namely, May 2019. The RECAI, developed by Ernst & Young, is considered an industry-standard for
gauging RE investment and deployment opportunities. The RECAI methodology takes into account what
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private investment in Romania’s RES infrastructure, and, by extension, efforts to
smarten its grid. The government should work on identifying – particularly with
outside organizations including relevant intergovernmental organizations and the
creators of RECAI – the structural and other reasons behind Romania’s failure to
attract investments, so that action may be better targeted. Policy declarations relating
to the national strategy for research, development, and innovation have been
criticized as vague, therefore, the government could do more to provide the requisite
clarity and specificity concerning its measures, objectives, and likely direction of its
policy to attract sorely needed investment.364
As for demand response, the government could consider bringing forward
the current target date of 2029, for smart meter proliferation given the positive
implications for DR objectives. As discussed earlier, DR development – currently
merely a legal possibility – is predicated on a variety of technical and non-technical
factors. Technological developments in storage and RES generation could, along
with DR, ensure that greater efficiencies in electricity are achieved through optimal
use patterns and the prevention of electricity redundancy/waste.

Ernst & Young consider factors affecting RE investment including a particular country’s longitudinal
energy needs, the policy context, technical and non-technical factors and mechanisms, macro-stability
prospects etc. While Romania is not listed, it is worth noting that EU peers including Belgium (53.3, 21 st),
Denmark (56.3, 12 th), Finland (49.1, 39 th), France (63.2, 3rd), Germany (61.9, 6 th), Greece (51.1, 30 th),
Ireland (52.8, 23rd), Italy (54.1, 18th), the Netherlands (57.2, 10 th), Portugal (52, 25th), Spain (54.3, 16th),
Sweden (51, 32nd), and the UK (58.3, 8 th) rank among the forty most attractive destinations for RE
investment (NB., RECAI score and rank listed after each country); compare with China (68.7, 1st), the
United States (66.7, 2 nd), India (63, 4th), Australia (62.4, 5th), Japan (59.2, 7th), and Argentina (57.4, 9 th),
and with, perhaps less obvious, contenders including Morocco (56.2, 13 th), Egypt (56.1, 14 th), Vietnam
(51.8, 26th), the Philippines (51.6, 27 th), Pakistan (50.7, 34th), Thailand (50.5, 35th), Kenya (49.3, 37th), and
Indonesia (49, 40 th). According to extrapolations made elsewhere, Romania’s RECAI ranking appears
average, despite considerable RES potential.); cf. Cîrstea et al., supra note 8, at 5.
364. ENERGY POLICY GROUP, The Draft of the Romanian National Energy-Climate Plan 2021-2030,
Policy Paper, (December 2018) at 17, https://www.enpg.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/NECPRomania-EPG-Analysis.pdf; cf. Commission Recommendation, supra note 79, at 4-6 (where the
Commission makes specific recommendations in this regard).

